

July 2, 1996

Introduced By: Nickels

cc:507G2

Proposed No.: 96-586

MOTION NO. **9899**

A MOTION authorizing the Executive to use King County employees to perform security screening; to station fully commissioned officers at the District Court locations; and to station limited commissioned officers at the Regional Justice Center.

WHEREAS, following the tragic events of March 2, 1995, when three women were shot to death in the King County Courthouse, the executive, the superior court, the district court, and the county council acted swiftly to develop, fund, and implement temporary emergency security measures to screen for weapons at the Courthouse and outlying district court facilities, and

WHEREAS, emergency security measures required the use of contract employees to screen for weapons and required the temporary deployment of police officers on an overtime basis to provide security at the King County Courthouse and the district court, and

WHEREAS, the King County council approved in Motion 9493 the policy that to protect court areas, it is necessary to exclude weapons from the building, except those carried by law enforcement personnel, and to screen for weapons at courtrooms and entrances to the King County Courthouse, and

WHEREAS, the King County council requested, in Motion 9822, a revised security staffing plan which assumed that county employees would be hired to perform security screening work, and

WHEREAS, the Executive recommends the use of county employees to perform security screening work, to station fully commissioned officers at the district court locations, and to use limited commissioned officers at the King County Courthouse and the Regional Justice Center;

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT MOVED by the Council of King County:

The County Executive is authorized to use King County employees to perform security screening; to station fully commissioned officers at the District Court locations; and to station limited commissioned officers at the Regional Justice Center.

PASSED by a vote of 11 to 1 this 15<sup>th</sup> day of July, 1976

KING COUNTY COUNCIL  
KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON

Louise Miller  
VICE Chair

ATTEST:

Gerald G. Peterson  
Clerk of the Council

Attachments:

96-586

---

9899

# KING COUNTY BUILDING SECURITY PLAN

## Phase I

MAY 5, 1995

---

KING COUNTY SECURITY PLAN - PHASE 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..... 3

INTRODUCTION..... 6  
 Scope of Report..... 6  
 Process for Developing the Report..... 6

GUIDING PRINCIPLES..... 8

LONG TERM SECURITY PLAN ..... 9

1. Program management..... 9  
 Department of Public Safety and Department of Construction and Facilities Management will have shared responsibility ..... 9  
 Areas of responsibility: Security..... 9  
 Security Oversight Committee ..... 10  
 Scope of Work – Phase II..... 11

2. King County Courthouse ..... 12  
 Level of security ..... 12  
 Weapons screening ..... 12  
 Policies and Procedures ..... 13  
 Operations ..... 13  
 Staffing..... 14  
 Facility modifications..... 15

3. King County District Courts ..... 18  
 Level of Security ..... 18  
 Weapons Screening..... 18  
 Policies and Procedures ..... 18  
 Operations ..... 18  
 Staffing..... 19  
 Facility modifications..... 19

4. Family Court Services, Harborview Secure Courtroom, Department of Youth Services ..... 21  
 Family Court Services..... 21  
 Harborview Secure Courtroom ..... 21  
 Department of Youth Services..... 21

5. Implementation Schedule ..... 23

SECOND INTERIM SECURITY PLAN: JUNE, 1995 TO DECEMBER, 1995..... 24

SUMMARY COSTS FOR KING COUNTY SECURITY PLAN ..... 25

APPENDICES ..... 28

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

---

From the tragic events of March 2, 1995, the Metropolitan King County government embarked on an intensive undertaking to assess its security needs and develop a long term approach to providing building security. Through a collaborative effort by the Executive, the Superior Court, the District Court, and the Council and with the assistance of security experts, this report puts forth an approach which addresses the immediate and long term security needs of County facilities with court and court-related operations. Once this report with its underlying operational and policy directions is approved, planning will begin on the second phase of this program to provide security to all other County facilities.

### Guiding Principles

Guiding principles set the direction for the plan proposed herein. The following principles are particularly noteworthy:

- As a provider of services to the public and a responsible employer, it is incumbent upon King County government to provide within practical limits the safest and most secure environment for the public, its employees, and elected officials.
- Effective security measures should be provided in a manner that is least intrusive and inconvenient to the public and employees.
- No security system is fail-safe. At best, a security system will provide a strong deterrent to violence, particularly that which arises from extreme, emotional situations.
- Security for the King County Courthouse entails screening for weapons at the entrances to the facility, based on the findings of the Superior Court, the County Executive, and the Metropolitan King County Council.
- All persons entering the Courthouse are subject to entrance screening.
- Entrance screening for the general public is necessary in the outlying court facilities to provide adequate security for the public and employees, based on the findings of the District Court.

### Management of Security

Management of the security program will be provided by the Department of Public Safety (DPS) during normal business hours (6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.) and the Department of Construction and Facilities Management (DCFM) at night and on weekends. DCFM will also continue to be responsible for non-security functions including fire alarms, building evacuations, and building systems such as elevators and HVAC. DPS will create a new security section staffed with an existing captain and sergeant position, and add one sergeant to oversee the District Court operations. While many options for managing the security program were considered, this option emphasized the strengths of both the Department of Public Safety and the Department of Construction and Facilities Management and builds on their history of close coordination.

### New Limited Commission Security Officer Position

To meet the unique combination of skills and knowledge for security, public interaction, court operations, and building-related operations, a new class of security officer within the Department of Public Safety is recommended. DPS will develop a training program which will specifically address these skills. Successful new hires will receive a limited

commission with which the officer has the authority to make arrests in the applicable facilities. The responsibilities of this position include oversight at entrance screening stations, response to calls and emergency situations, and secure weapons in lock boxes.

## Long Term Plan

The following table summarizes the recommendations for each facility:

	KC Courthouse	District Court Divisions	Department of Youth Services	Family Court Services/ Harborview Court
Entrance Screening	Yes - Public and Employees, 24 hours/day	Yes - Public Only, business hours	Yes - Public and Employees	Screen for weapons at entrance to court areas
Separate Entrances	All persons are subject to screening.	Employees will have access to separate entrance.	Until completion of facility review, some DYS/Court employees have access to separate employee entrances	N/A
Staffing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Limited commission officer (day)</li> <li>Contract staff (day)</li> <li>DCFM Security Guards (evening, weekend)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Limited commission officer (day)</li> <li>Contract staff (day)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Limited commission officer (day)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Limited commission officer</li> </ul>
Secondary Court Screening	Secondary screening for family courts and high security criminal matters.	When circumstances warrant, secondary screening is available.	When circumstances warrant, secondary screening is available.	N/A
Perimeter Doors and Stairwells	All doors electronically locked with fire release and monitored with alarms and cameras.	Replace many doors and re-key or install keypad access for employees	Under review for Phase II plan.	NA
Duress Alarms	Install in courtrooms and many other county offices.	Install in certain divisions.	Under review for Phase II plan.	Facility modifications under review
Photo ID System for Building Access Control	Regional Justice Center, Jail and security systems will be coordinated so all employees use one access card.	Regional Justice Center, Jail and security systems will be coordinated so all employees use one access card.	Regional Justice Center, Jail and security systems will be coordinated so all employees use one access card.	Regional Justice Center, Jail and security systems will be coordinated so all employees use one access card.
Additional Long Term Staffing Costs	\$1,507,440	\$907,465	\$183,278	\$122,186
Facility Modification Costs	1995: \$1,037,000 1996: \$359,320	1995: \$379,738 1996: \$145,275	Under review for Phase II plan	Under review for Phase II plan

### Security Oversight Committee

Given the mutual interest of the Superior Court, the District Court, the Executive, and the Council in building security, representatives from these branches will continue to develop the security program and monitoring the program once it is implemented.

### Second Interim Security Plan

Implementation of the long term plan will require at least until the end of 1995. This time is needed to make modifications to facilities, to design a training program for the new security officer positions, and to hire and train the successful applicants. In the interim, the current security efforts will continue with the following adjustments:

- A competitive bidding process for contract staff;
- Remove staff on the perimeter doors of the Courthouse when facility modifications to the perimeter doors are completed;
- Create and staff the Central Monitoring Station;
- Implement scheduled deliveries at loading dock and eliminate the overtime police officer position currently staffing this post during the emergency interim period; and
- Hire additional, qualified, retired police officers as limited commission security officers to replace posts filled by overtime police officers during the emergency interim period.

The additional operating cost during the second interim period is estimated as follows:

	Additional Cost June-July 1995
King County Courthouse	\$642,113
District Court Divisions	\$636,666
Operations and Maintenance	\$10,000
Total	\$1,288,780

## INTRODUCTION

---

On March 2, 1995, three women were shot to death outside a Superior Court courtroom on the second floor of the King County Courthouse. This tragic event generated an unprecedented effort to dramatically improve the security of the King County Courthouse for both the public and employees. The King County Executive submitted on March 3, and the Metropolitan King County Council approved on March 6, emergency interim measures to implement entrance screening in the King County Courthouse. The District Court also implemented entrance screening as the result of a finding that screening for weapons and other security improvements were necessary for the continued safe operation of the District Court facilities. Funding was provided for 90 days of interim security while the Executive developed, with the guidance and input of the Superior Court and the District Court, a long term security plan.

This report represents the policy and operational framework for a permanent security operation for King County facilities with court or court-related operations. In addition to the King County Courthouse and District Court outlying facilities, the court operations at the Department of Youth Services, Central Building, and Harborview are all included in this plan. Once the policy direction contained in this plan is approved, a second phase of planning will occur, to include all remaining County-owned facilities and screening mail and packages. It is expected that the security operation in the court-related facilities such as the Courthouse will become the "hub" for managing security at other county facilities.

### *Scope of Report*

The plan presented in this report addresses the following critical policy and operational issues:

- Who will manage the security operations,
- What level of security will be provided,
- What is the relationship between security and other life/safety functions,
- What type of employees will operate the security program,
- What facility modifications are necessary,
- What is the time-frame for implementing the long term plan,
- What measures are needed until implementation of the long term plan, and
- What are the expected costs.

To answer these questions, this report includes a proposed set of guiding principles. This section is followed by sections on the long term plan for each court-related facility which includes level of security, staffing, and facility modifications. The next two sections cover a discussion of the operations, implementation schedule and projected costs for the long term plan. The final section includes an interim plan for security operations for the period June through December 1995, while the long term plan will be implemented.

### *Process for Developing the Report*

Under the overall direction of the Sheriff, two groups were primarily responsible for drafting this report.

The Oversight Group consisted of representatives from the Superior Court, the District Court, the County Council, the Executive Office, and the Office of Financial Management.



The Sheriff convened this group weekly to consider significant policy and operational issues for the long term plan.

The Technical Working Group consisted of staff from the Department of Public Safety, Superior Court, District Court, Department of Construction and Facilities Management, the central staff for the County Council, and the Office of Financial Management. This group and its subcommittees met two or three times a week to thoroughly review security issues and create a framework for discussion in the Oversight Group. The Office of Prosecuting Attorney and the Office of Human Resource Management provided legal and technical assistance. Two security experts provided recommendations on security systems and architectural changes as well as advice on the proposed operational plan.

## GUIDING PRINCIPLES

---

As discussions among the various groups developing this report proceeded, several principles emerged which are key to King County's approach to providing security in facilities operated by King County.

### General Principles Applicable to All Facilities.

- As a provider of services to the public and a responsible employer, it is incumbent upon King County government to provide within practical limits the safest and most secure environment for the public, its employees, and elected officials.
- Effective security measures should be provided in a manner that is least intrusive and inconvenient to the public and employees.
- An effective security program will entail a customer-service approach in which the public and employees have easy access to security personnel, are given the opportunity to provide input on the program, and are well informed about security issues.
- No security system is fail-safe. At best, a security system will provide a strong deterrent to violence, particularly that which arises from extremely emotional situations.
- The security plan should be regularly evaluated and updated based on the changing needs of the agencies who use the facilities.
- Security should be tightly coordinated with other life/safety and physical plant systems in the facility. This coordination will ensure that the decision-making authority and responsibilities in an emergency are clear, and that the necessary interventions to any system (security, fire, electrical, HVAC, elevators, etc.) are performed swiftly and by the appropriate personnel.

### King County Courthouse

- Based on the findings of the Superior Court, the County Executive, and the Metropolitan King County Council, security for the King County Courthouse entails screening for weapons at the entrances to the facility.
- All persons entering the Courthouse are subject to entrance screening.

### District Court Facilities

- Based on the findings of the District Court, entrance screening for the general public is necessary in the outlying court facilities to provide adequate security for the public and employees.

## LONG TERM SECURITY PLAN

---

### 1. Program management

***Department of Public Safety and Department of Construction and Facilities Management will have shared responsibility for the program.***

The security program will be managed by the Department of Public Safety during normal business hours (6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.), and the Department of Construction and Facilities Management at night (6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.) and on weekends. One captain and two supervising sergeants will be designated to oversee two operational locations: 1) the Courthouse and court-related locations, and 2) the eight outlying District Court locations. A new section with security as its main purpose will be created. A new class of limited commission officer within DPS will be created to address security needs. Staff functions are described in the "Operations" section of the Courthouse and District Court sections of this report.

The Department of Public Safety will be primarily responsible in matters of Courthouse and courtroom security, although both the Department of Public Safety and Department of Construction and Facilities Management have staff working normal business hours. During the day, the Department of Construction and Facilities Management will have staff working continue to provide non-police functions like fire alarms, emergency announcements, building damage, and safety incident reporting. The two departments will coordinate closely in the event of an emergency.

Existing Superior Court officers will continue their employment with the Court until January 1, 1996, and those who apply and test successfully for the new security officer position can be hired by DPS effective January 1.

## *Areas of responsibility: Security*

### *DPS functions will include:*

- Courthouse security responses during the day
- Courtroom screening
- Courthouse entrance screening during the day
- Arrest and detention of law violators
- Management of contract security staff
- Primary responsibility for court areas
- Storage and handling of weapons
- Removing trespassers
- Monitoring at Central Monitoring Station from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
- Investigate threats to personnel
- Employee escorts during the day

### *DCFM functions will include:*

- Backup for courthouse security response during the day
- Primary responsibility for fire alarms
- Courthouse entrance screening during night hours
- Monitoring work release traffic from 4:30 p.m. to 8:00 a.m.
- Contact for fire department inspections, violations, corrections
- Emergency plans required by fire department
- After hours emergency contact for all County buildings
- Employee escorts during night hours
- Outlying building alarm and fire monitoring contracts
- "Fire watch" duty when systems go down
- Courthouse complex theft, damage and safety incident reports
- Contract management and fiscal responsibility
- Emergency response outside Courthouse
- Non-police functions, such as fire alarms, fire drill schedule, emergency announcements and emergency fire plans

### *ersight Committee*

the formation of a Security Oversight Committee, representatives of the Court, the District Court, the Council and the Executive will meet to develop the program and to monitor it once it is implemented. Furthermore, at the start of the new security program, it is expected that the courts will provide valuable input on the detailed job description of the new security officer, the design of facility modifications, and the final security designations for the facility.

### *ork -- Phase II*

second phase of planning for security improvements will occur once the security plan developed for court-related functions of the County is underway. Phase II will include reviewing County-owned facilities, facility modifications for DYS, the Harborview courtroom, and a more in-depth review of the need to screen mail and packages. The Phase II plan will be transmitted as part of the Executive's 1996 recommended

primary list of the facilities to be included in Phase II includes:

- King County Administration Building and Garage
- Yesler Building
- Prefontaine Building
- Smith Tower
- Columbia Center
- Bank of California
- AT & T Gateway Tower
- Exchange Building

## 2. King County Courthouse

### *Level of security*

Different areas of the Courthouse have different security needs. For example, doors to inner and outer stairwells might be secured differently depending on their use and the potential for problems to occur. A floor-by-floor assessment of security needs in the Courthouse is outlined below and in Appendix 1.

Protecting both court-related areas and areas of public access in the King County Courthouse will be achieved in four ways:

1. Screening all public and employees for weapons at entrances to the building;
2. Enhancing the security of County and Court offices located inside the Courthouse;
3. Continuing weapons screening for high-risk Court-related areas; and
4. Providing patrol and reactive response, dispatched from a central monitoring station where stairwells and entrances are monitored by means of a video surveillance system.

This approach allows King County to stop the entry of weapons to the building as a whole, ensures that court proceedings remain safe, and provides a swift response to emergency situations which may arise. Facility modifications which support these operations include securing the four perimeter stairwells with key-card access, fire-alarm release doors, and allowing the two north internal stairwells to be used for public and employee traffic.

A floor-by-floor survey of the Courthouse was conducted in order to better determine the type and extent ("level") of security desired to secure the Courthouse. The following steps were taken to determine the level of security needed:

- Identifying the uses and purposes of each floor and the Courthouse as a whole;
- Identifying the security needs for each work area. This work was done in conjunction with employee groups in each area; and
- Making recommendations about the level of security needed to achieve the goals for that area.

The security assessment for the Courthouse, attached as Appendix 1, gave the Security Oversight Group guidance on different approaches to securing the Courthouse.

### *Weapons screening*

Security officers' response to persons attempting to carry weapons into the Courthouse will be as follows, in keeping with the provisions of RCW 9.41.300, RCW 70.74.010, and RCW 9A.52:

- ***Concealed handguns - legal:*** If the individual has a concealed weapons license, officers will store the firearm in a gun locker near the first floor entrance for the duration of the person's stay in the Courthouse. The gun owner will be able to retrieve his or her weapon at any time. If the person remains after hours, the key for the gun locker will be turned over to night security staff. Persons who need to store legal firearms will only be able to do so at the Third Avenue entrance;

escorts to the gun lockers from the Fourth Avenue entrance or Tunnel entrance would leave the entrance without an officer presence to deal with emergencies.

- **Concealed handguns - illegal:** If a person carries a concealed handgun into the Courthouse without a concealed weapons license, officers will arrest the person. A background check will follow; if the charge is illegally carrying a concealed weapon, the individual will be cited. Discovery of prior violent criminal history may lead to a more serious charge.
- **Illegal weapons under State statute:** If the individual brings other illegal weapons into the Courthouse, the weapon will be confiscated, tagged and given to the security supervisor at the end of the day. Under RCW 9.41.300, it is unlawful for persons to knowingly carry specific weapons into court-related areas, including: firearms and explosives, sand clubs, metal knuckles, spring blade knives, "gravity knives", and slung shots. RCW 9.41.300 also states that "*Weapon*" as used in this section means any firearm, explosive defined in RCW 70.74.010 or instrument or weapon listed in RCW 9.41.250.' RCW 9.41.250 states that: "*Every person who . . .furtively carries with intent to conceal any dagger, dirk pistol or other dangerous weapon. . .is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. . .*" The Security Oversight Committee will continue to seek advice from the King County Prosecutor regarding those weapons not specifically listed in the statute, and whether those weapons can be permitted into the Courthouse.
- **Illegal weapons under Seattle Municipal Code:** In keeping with Seattle Municipal Code 12A.14 and 12A.06, the following items are also considered illegal in the City of Seattle: any fixed-blade knife, any folding knife with a blade length in excess of 3.5 inches, swords, daggers, bayonets, bolo knives (machetes), hatchets, axes, straight-edged razors, razor blades not in their original packaging, "blackjacks," "chako sticks," throwing stars.

## **Policies and Procedures**

The Department of Public Safety will draft policies and procedures for providing security in the Courthouse in keeping with efforts in other jurisdictions, experience in King County with interim security, and the most practical approaches to most situations. The aim of the policies and procedures is to ensure a professional approach to security with a minimum of inconvenience to the public and King County employees, and will govern the conduct of security employees during all hours.

## **Operations**

Weapons screening will be conducted 24 hours a day, with two screening stations during business hours at Third Avenue (first floor), one screening station at the Administration Building Tunnel (first floor), and one screening station at Fourth Avenue (second floor), in order to secure the building and still allow access by Courthouse users during all hours. The staff deployment at each station will be essentially identical: two screening staff will operate one walk-through screener, and one staff member will operate each x-ray machine, with oversight and supervision by an officer. Screening staff will rotate their posts among the three types of screening equipment (this is also an opportunity to provide relief for each staff member).

Persons entering the Courthouse will place packages on the x-ray machine belt and walk through the magnetic screener. If the equipment signals the possible presence of a

weapon, secondary hand-held screeners will be used by screening staff. Officers will handle and store weapons and provide response to any emergency or other situations which might occur at that entrance.

Patrol of the Courthouse during the day, and response to emergency and other situations will be performed a contingent of officers based out of the Security Office on the first floor. Communication will be by radio on the 800 MHz system, with the central dispatch located in the first floor security office. Information about how to contact the Security Office in the case of an emergency will be widely distributed to King County employees.

Upon request, high-risk court proceedings will have a walk-through screener at the entrance of the designated courtroom; a permanent secondary screening station with a walk-through screener and two security officers will be available for the Family Law Courtrooms on the third floor and at the entrance to the Criminal Presiding courtroom on the 12<sup>th</sup> floor, where arraignments are conducted.

From 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., the Fourth Avenue entrance and Tunnel screening stations will be closed, leaving the first floor entrance at Third Avenue available for screening after normal business hours. Persons entering the Courthouse through the Tunnel from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. will be screened at the first floor screening station at Third Avenue.

## **Staffing**

A new class of security officer will be created, and two types of security personnel for all Phase I locations will be used: first, the limited commission officer will be responsible for the providing the safety and security functions, providing patrol, emergency response and entrance screening station oversight, and second, a contract screening staff position will operate all screening equipment (hand-held screeners, walk-through screeners and x-ray machines), and operate the central monitoring station. In keeping with the needs of Superior Court and experience with security efforts, the following basic skills will be required of the two types of staff:

- **Security Officer (Limited Commission):** will have appropriate police experience, be granted a limited commission by the Sheriff, establishing the police powers granted. This new position will have police powers, including the authority to make arrests within court areas and to conduct investigations. An officer will attend initial training, weapons certification and ongoing instruction as required to maintain the limited commission status. The officer will have the ability to take remedial action in the case of an emergency, and respond to Courthouse areas as requested. He or she will also provide oversight to ensure the quality of the screening process. The officer is also expected to interact with the public and employees in a customer-service manner. Finally, the officer will have a basic understanding of the building systems (fire, elevators, electronic security systems) to ensure optimal coordination with DCFM.
- **Contract Screener:** will have equipment operation, dispatch, self-defense, customer service and emergency training to allow staff to conduct weapons screening at the entrances. The person who performs this function during the day will operate and monitor the machines located at all entrances to the building where the general public and employees have access to the building. He or she will be expected to have a personable and friendly demeanor, and be capable of conducting the required searches in the least obtrusive manner. King County will



enter into an open, competitive bidding process to select a company to provide the contract staff.

- **DCFM Security Guards:** will continue current facility and security responsibilities screen for weapons at night and on the weekend, and staff the central monitoring station.

Each type of staff will conduct the security function for the Courthouse in accordance with the policies and procedures outlined by DPS, and their training will be coordinated with disaster and emergency preparedness efforts already underway in King County. Superior and District Court will be an integral part of recruiting, hiring and setting training standards for the officers. The Courthouse effort will require 20 officers and 18 contract staff screeners. Estimated additional staffing costs for the Courthouse in 1996 are estimated at \$ million.

### **Facility modifications**

The Security Oversight Group solicited the advice of two security consultants for recommendations to modify the Courthouse building for the security plan. The first study, by Robert Glass & Associates, Inc., is attached as Appendix 2 of this report.

The Glass report, summarized here, establishes a comprehensive security system for the Courthouse and recommends that the County investigate the sharing of monitoring/control systems among other county facilities and other court-related functions. Other recommendations include:

- **Lighting (\$41,600):** Add additional lighting at Third and Fourth Avenue.
- **Entrances and Screening (\$396,500):** Create policies for persons subject to entrance screening, develop Third Avenue as the primary entrance for public use, install anti-assault revolving doors and ADA-compliant sliding doors at all public entrances, make several architectural modifications to the Third and Fourth Avenue entrances. The modifications to Third and Fourth Avenue entrances include enlarging the entrance lobby and adding exterior doors in the area nearest the street.
- **Fire lane:** Close the fire lane south of the Courthouse and open it only for scheduled deliveries.
- **Loading Dock:** Close the loading dock except for specific, appointment-only delivery hours, when an officer will be present to check invoices. Make video and voice contact available to the officer on the loading dock for delivery times.
- **Tunnel to Municipal Building:** Restrict use to the transportation of inmates and evidence-related materials. Make video and voice controls available at the door to the tunnel.
- **Intrusion Detection System:** Install an intrusion detection system covering perimeter doors to the Courthouse, monitored at the Central Monitoring Station (below). Install after-hours, monitored motion detectors in accessible windows.
- **Stairways (\$136,500):** Install locks on the four perimeter and south central stairwells which unlock during fire or "no power" situations. These would not be accessible to the public except in emergencies. Where the stairwells are used by employees for access to other floors, card access will be installed. Where the stairwell opens to the street, monitored video and motion detectors will be installed

(dependent upon the installation of adequate lighting and "field of view" camera tests). Make north central stairwells available for public and employee circulation.

- **Photo Identification Badge System/Building Access Control (\$265,720):** Create a system in which employees use photo identification badges for after-hours use of elevators and employee-specific access to entrances and office areas. The new system will be designed to operate at the King County Correctional Facility, the Regional Justice Center and other County facilities to avoid duplication of access cards.
- **Elevator Controls:** Install access card readers in designated after-hours elevators for use by employees and after-hours Courthouse users (for example, temporary cards could be issued to visitors to the Law Library). (Cost included in building access control, above.)
- **Video Surveillance System (\$78,000):** Install video cameras monitored in two ways by the Central Monitoring Station: first, remote areas will be continuously monitored, and second, selective monitoring will occur when motion-sensitive cameras are activated. Fifteen initial locations are designated for installation. The system will also be activated through use of the duress alarm system.
- **Duress Alarm System (\$195,000):** Locations will be recommended in conjunction with the Justice Systems Incorporated study of the duress alarm system.
- **Central Monitoring Station (\$156,000):** Create a central location where all perimeter entry and exit, reception counter, security back-up, and emergency and life safety systems are monitored.

The estimated cost for all facility improvements in the Courthouse is \$1,037,000 in 1995 and \$359,320 in 1996.

The second study, performed by Justice Systems Incorporated, recommends changes to the duress alarm system currently in use by Superior Court. A complete report will be available by late May, 1995, which incorporates the findings of the Glass study, this plan, and will be included as part of the costs of the security plan.

- **Preliminary findings by Justice Systems, Incorporated include:**

*...significant reliability problems with the two, parallel duress alarm systems currently installed in the King County Courthouse and the cellular telephone system used for security communications.*

*With respect to an older, "hard-wired" duress alarm system that reports to an alarm console in the Communications Center, its reliability was compromised by wiring integrity problems and intermittent staffing. A newer, "soft-wired" and "remote" alarm system that was intended to supplement the older system was found to be less reliable than the older system. It also suffered from wiring integrity problems, compounded by slow and unpredictable response times, and non-functional or lost remote buttons.*

*The cellular telephone system that is currently used for voice security communications and to establish a direct audio link with a speakerphone at the alarm site was also found unreliable. Cellular coverage of the lower floors is poor and calls are often blocked by other traffic. The direct audio link feature was*

*found to be generally inaudible and difficult to operate with sometimes unpredictable results."*

These findings will be further reviewed by the Security Oversight Group.

■ **Preliminary recommendations by Justice Systems, Incorporated include:**

1. *Replace the existing, parallel duress alarm systems with a new centrally-monitored system, partially reutilizing existing push-buttons and wiring.*
2. *Dedicate wiring to the alarm systems and do not share wiring with another system. Electronically supervise alarm wiring for integrity and provide an automatic trouble alarm at the central monitoring station when problems are detected.*
3. *Eliminate the alarm paging feature by not installing the optional alarm paging system.*
4. *Completely eliminate the use of cellular telephones for security communications, including eliminating the direct audio link feature between the alarm sit speakerphone and responding security personnel.*
5. *Purchase portable radios and install a desktop station, bi-directional amplifiers, and additional antenna system in order to use the County-wide, 800 MHz trunked radio system for security communications.*

Three levels of alternative surveillance and recording systems, each more inclusive than the last, are recommended to equip locations with audio and video contact with the central monitoring station.

## 3. King County District Courts

### *Level of Security*

The Seattle Division of District Court, located in the King County Courthouse, is considered to be part of the Courthouse security effort. Protecting the employees and public at each of the eight District Court divisions will be achieved in three ways:

1. Screening the public for weapons at entrances to the building;
2. Enhancing the security of several key areas inside each court area;
3. Providing reactive response to situations which arise in each court building.

The Department of Public Safety conducted security surveys in each of the King County District Court worksites and developed a security plan for each court in conjunction with an interview with each court administrator. The surveys included a review of site specifications for the individual court, identified security concerns, and examined a diagram of each court. Security recommendations were then made in two phases: near-term and long term. The surveys were then sent to the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs for review and recommendation. A copy of the survey is available upon request.

### *Weapons Screening*

District Court has adopted a policy that all members of the public entering District Court facilities will be subject to weapons screening. The Department of Public Safety, in managing the program, will implement an approach similar to the King County Courthouse to implement this policy: a walk-through screening station placed at the entrance to each building, with lockers available to store firearms. Employees who show proper identification will not be subject to screening.

### *Policies and Procedures*

The Department of Public Safety will draft policies and procedures for providing security in the District Court outlying divisions in keeping with efforts in other jurisdictions, experience in King County with interim security, and the most practical approaches to most situations. The aim of the policies and procedures is to ensure a professional approach to security with a minimum of inconvenience to the public and King County employees, and will govern the conduct of employees during all hours.

### *Operations*

Entrance screening will be conducted at each division 10 hours a day, with screening stations at each entrance, and a screening station available on days court is in operation at the Mercer Island Division (which operates only on Fridays) and the Vashon Division (which operates two days per month). The staff deployment at each station will be identical to the Courthouse operation: one screening staff person to operate the screening equipment and one officer to provide response and oversight of the screening program.

As in the Courthouse, if the equipment signals the possible presence of a weapon, secondary hand-held screeners will be used by officers and screening staff. Officers will

handle and store weapons and provide response to any emergency or other situations which might occur at that entrance.

Patrol and response functions for each District Court division will be conducted by the officer on duty at the location as needed.

## **Staffing**

The two types of personnel listed in the Courthouse section (officer, screener) will be used to provide security in District Court divisions. The District Court security effort will require 13.5 officers and 8 screeners.

## **Facility modifications**

Following the DPS review of District Court divisions, the following facility recommendations were made for each division.

- **Aukeen Division (\$7,614):** Install an alarm locator device to isolate a duress call, alarm non-public exterior doors, require all personnel to enter through the main lobby scanner, provide a secure fence around the employee area.
- **Bellevue Division (\$76,050):** Remove exterior door handles, install duress alarms in courtrooms, clerk's desk and lobby counter, build a wall from the lobby to Department Three (creating one screening point), install directional signs, limit vehicle access to authorized vehicles only.
- **Federal Way Division (\$34,858):** Erect a fence on the north and west sides (depends on zoning requirements), install duress alarms in judge offices, remove exterior handles on non-public exterior doors, make several other doorway modifications, and add a gate between the judge's bench and door (depends on building code requirements).
- **Issaquah Division (\$17,973):** Replace hollow-core doors with solid wood or metal doors, install alarms on exterior doors and stairwell doors, add a gate between judge's bench and courtroom, upgrade judge benches to National Institute of Justice standards.
- **Mercer Island Division (\$1,664):** Alarm door between clerk's office and jury room, remove exterior door handles and alarm judge's chamber door, install shades on exterior windows.
- **Northeast Division (\$33,267):** Alarm exterior doors, courtroom exit doors and judge's chambers, re-key building, repair broken fence lock, make counter area "bullet-proof," install gate between judge's bench and wall in all courtrooms.
- **Renton Division (\$28,223):** Alarm exterior doors, rear courtroom doors, replace counter plexiglass, make clerk's counter "bullet-proof," remove exterior door handles.
- **Seattle Division (\$82,550):** Included as part of Courthouse effort. Also, relocate clerk's counter, make judge benches "bullet-proof," install plexiglass in bailiff's work area.

- **Shoreline Division (\$20,657):** Alarm rear courtroom doors, non-public exterior doors, re-key all doors and re-code alarm system, add a gate between judge's bench and wall, erect a fence surrounding employee area, secure roof windows.
- **Southwest Division (\$43,602):** Review procedures with security company to ensure that court is contacted when duress alarm is activated, install keypad access to interior stairwell, alarm and remove door handles to west entrance, reconfigure floor plan to alleviate traffic flow problems.
- **Vashon Division:** Install duress alarms at all counters, keypad access between the police department and court, install plexiglass and court and police counters, install solid-core doors, modify bench to incorporate bailiff work area, update judge bench to NIJ standards. (Costs are included in estimates for Southwest Division.)

Estimated facility modification costs for 10 divisions are \$525,013.

## Court Services, Harborview Secure Courtroom, Department Services

Court-related areas are outside the King County Courthouse; weapons screening officer's presence will be provided by the Department of Public Safety.

### *rt Services*

Court Services provides court-ordered mediation and conciliation services in relations and family law cases. Located in the Central Building (Third Avenue Division), the Superior Court business conducted here often entails highly emotional pressured situations. The security goal is to prohibit weapons from entering the and have security personnel available to assist in diffusing tense situations if As part of the security plan, an officer will be stationed at the offices during g hours, and will screen for weapons with a hand-held screener. Staff have l five priority facility modifications for offices, including:

- Install bulletproof glass adjacent to the lobby;
- Install a duress alarm from each office to the receptionist;
- Restrict access to one main entrance and screen for weapons (done April, 1995);
- Give staff access to the state mainframe systems to determine if a client has a criminal history; and
- Install an automatic closing device on each door exiting the offices (done April, 1995).

### **Secure Courtroom**

Harborview Secure Courtroom, located at Harborview Medical Center on Ninth and James, in-custody hearings are conducted for involuntary commitment The goal for this area, again, is to prohibit weapons and have security personnel as needed. Under the security plan, an officer would be dispatched to the n during ho rs of operation from the Central Monitoring Station in the King Courthouse, and screen all persons entering the courtroom for weapons using a d scanner.

### **of Youth Services**

Department of Youth Services facility at Twelfth Avenue and Alder is a multi-use Weapons screening has been in place at this facility for two years. The security retains the current deployment of staff and equipment for screening at DYS for two screening staff operating a walk through scanner and searching packages and-held scanner if indicated, and an officer providing patrol and response. issues for facility modifications and additional equipment (such as an x-ray are underway as part of a separate capital planning effort and will be addressed ll of the security plan. Communication will likely be by radio, with a duress tem feeding to and dispatch from the Central Monitoring Station.

**9899**

These three court-related locations will require 6 officers, at an additional annual cost of \$366,566. A full-staff model is attached as Appendix 3.



## 5. Implementation Schedule

Item	Anticipated Date
• Security Phase I completed and transmitted to Council	May 5
• Review duress alarm Phase II	May 8
• Review scope of work for Security Phase II	May 10
• Revise final scope of work for duress alarm Phase II	May 22
• Design of facility improvements	May 22
• Development of RFP for duress alarm Phase II	May 29
• Establish equipment list; order equipment	May 29
• Begin permit process	May 31
• Develop RFQ for contract security services	June 2
• Determine WMBE, insurance and other requirements for facility improvements	June 2
• Obtain approval and identify funding for duress alarm Phase II	June 5
• Finalize design, approval from Oversight Committee for facility improvements	June 7
• Finalize cost estimates for facility improvements	June 21
• RFQ Process for contract staff vendor	July 14
• Pre-bid meeting: contract staff	July 17
• RFP for duress alarm Phase II	July 19
• Recruit for new security officer position	July 24
• Receive and evaluate RFQs: contract staff	July 24
• RFP review and contract award for duress alarm phase II	July 25
• Select contractor to provide security staff	July 26
• Construction phase: facility improvements	August 1
• Negotiate and finalize contract: contract staff	August 1
• DPS and OHRM approve job classification specifications and salary for new officer position	August 2
• Construction phase closes for facility modification	August 9
• Testing, training on security devices, procedures	August 31
• Establish qualified applicant list for security officer position	September 10
• Development of Security Phase II	September 17
• Executive transmittal: Phase II	October 17
• Projected Council review/approval of long term plan (1996 budget)	October 30
• Begin hiring new security officers	

**SECOND INTERIM SECURITY PLAN: JUNE, 1995 TO DECEMBER, 1995**

---

The Department of Public Safety will begin preparing immediately for the transfer of the program and staff in the 1996 budget by working with the Office of Human Resource management to develop a job description, and beginning the hiring process for the new officer position. However, DPS will not be able to immediately implement every item outlined in this report. To allow for time to hire staff, during the period June 1, 1995 to December 31, 1995, the current entrance screening efforts will continue, with several modifications.

**Close the loading dock.** The loading dock will be closed and DPS officer overtime will no longer be used for that location. Either a court security officer or the relief DPS officer for the entrance screening posts will attend to the loading dock during scheduled delivery hours (10 a.m. to noon, three days a week).

**Change contract staff vendors.** Emergency provisions will need to be extended while the bidding process is underway to select a permanent vendor to provide security staff to operate equipment. This process is anticipated to take two to four months.

**Install cameras in the stairwells.** The security provided by DCFM staff in the four perimeter stairwells will be provided by installing cameras and lighting sufficient to screen the entry and exit of each stairwell. The cameras will be monitored in the Central Monitoring station. The equipment should be installed by mid-June.

**Hire retired limited commission officers.** To reduce the use of overtime police officers brought on under the emergency measures, DPS, the Superior Court, and the District Court will seek to hire additional retired limited commission officers.

During the interim period March 3, 1995 to May 26, 1995, costs for the emergency response were about \$100,000 per week for staff at all locations. By implementing the options outlined above, anticipated additional costs for the second interim period are expected to continue at this level; the second interim costs are estimated to be \$1,288,780 through the close of 1995. Staff and operations costs, plus the facility modifications which can be made in 1995, are detailed in Appendix 4.

King County Long-Term Security Plan - Estimated Additional 1996 Cost

	FTEs and Staff locations	Estimated cost
Courthouse Total		\$ 1,507,440
Officers (FTE)	20	
Screeners (contract)	18	
Department of Youth Services Total		\$ 183,278
Officers (FTE)	4	
Screeners (contract)	0	
Family Court Services Total		\$ 61,093
Officers (FTE)	1	
Screeners (contract)	0	
Harborview Secure Courtroom Total		\$ 61,093
Officers (FTE)	1	
Screeners (contract)	0	
District Courts Total		\$ 907,465
Officers (FTE)	14	
Screeners (contract)	8	
<b>Staffing &amp; O&amp;M Costs</b>		<b>\$ 2,720,368</b>
Less 1995 Superior Court Security Budget		\$ (640,000)
<b>Total additional 1996 cost</b>		<b>\$ 2,080,368</b>

**Cond Interim Security Plan (June-December, 1995):  
Locations and Staffing Costs**

	Staff locations (Posts)	Estimated cost
		\$ 642,113
(overtime)	5	
(contract)	18	
Total		\$ 636,666
(overtime)	10	
(contract)	8	
		\$ 10,000
1995 cost		<u>\$ 1,288,780</u>

## King County Security Plan: Estimated cost of facility modifications

	Total	1995	1996
<b>King County Courthouse</b>			
Entrances and Screening			
Lighting	\$ 41,600		\$ 41,600
Rotating Doors	\$ 84,000	\$ 84,000	
X-Ray Machines	\$ 126,000	\$ 126,000	
Third Avenue Improvements	\$ 104,000	\$ 104,000	
Fourth Avenue Improvements	\$ 32,500	\$ 32,500	
Intrusion Detection	\$ 52,000		\$ 52,000
Stairwells			
MWCE	\$ 58,500	\$ 58,500	
Locks	\$ 78,000	\$ 78,000	
Building Access Control			
Key card access (MWCE)	\$ 247,000		\$247,000
Locks	\$ 18,720		\$ 18,720
Video Surveillance	\$ 78,000	\$ 78,000	
Duress Alarm System	\$ 195,000	\$ 195,000	
Central Monitoring Station			
MWCE	\$ 123,500	\$ 123,500	
Architectural improvements	\$ 32,500	\$ 32,500	
Equipment (i.e., radios)	\$ 125,000	\$ 125,000	
<b>District Courts</b>			
Aukeen	\$ 7,614	\$ 7,614	
Bellevue	\$ 76,050	\$ 76,050	
Mercer Island	\$ 1,664	\$ 1,664	
Federal Way	\$ 34,858	\$ 34,858	
Issaquah	\$ 17,973	\$ 17,973	
Northeast	\$ 33,267	\$ 33,267	
Renton	\$ 28,223	\$ 28,223	
Seattle	\$ 82,550	\$ 82,550	
Shoreline	\$ 20,657	\$ 20,657	
Southwest/Vashon	\$ 43,602	\$ 43,602	
All divisions (wall, keypad, lockbox)	\$ 33,280	\$ 33,280	
Central electronic access system	\$ 145,275		\$145,275
<b>Courthouse Total</b>	<b>\$ 1,396,320</b>	<b>\$ 1,037,000</b>	<b>\$ 359,320</b>
<b>District Courts Total</b>	<b>\$ 525,013</b>	<b>\$ 379,738</b>	<b>\$ 145,275</b>
<b>Total all locations</b>	<b>\$ 1,921,333</b>	<b>\$ 1,416,738</b>	<b>\$ 504,595</b>

## APPENDICES

---

Appendix 1: Floor-by Floor Assessment of Security Needs in the King County Courthouse

Appendix 2: Recommendations for Architectural Modifications for the King County Courthouse, Seattle, Washington: Robert Glass and Associates

Appendix 3: King County Long term Security Plan Operational and Facility Costs

Appendix 4: Second Interim Security Plan Operational and Facility Costs

## APPENDIX 1: Floor by floor assessment of security needs in the King County Courthouse

### 1. *Basement*

#### A. To Seattle Public Safety Building

1. Uses/Purposes: Transport of prisoner and evidence from Seattle Public Safety to KCCF
2. Security recommendation: Card or remote access; camera; close off
3. Security goal/options: Limit access to transfer of prisoners and evidence only

#### B. To Fourth Avenue

1. Uses/Purposes: County Executive, Sheriff's parking, Facilities Management shops access
2. Security recommendation: Card or remote access; camera
3. Security goal/options: Limit access/reduce to necessary functions

#### C. DJA Exhibit Room

1. Uses/Purposes: Store/transport exhibits
2. Security recommendation: Restricted access via button remote, need camera, new duress alarm
3. Security goal/options: Upgrade existing systems

#### D. Area-Way Door (James Street)

1. Uses/Purposes: Emergency exit from basement
2. Security recommendation: Alarm and camera
3. Security goal/options: Keep as exit only; ensure no access to adjacent stairwell

### 2. *First Floor*

#### A. Third Avenue Entrance

1. Uses/Purposes: General public/employee access, messenger/courier service
2. Security recommendation: Entrance screening for weapons; x-ray - goal to keep out firearms, add gun lockers and weapons listed in statute; cameras for after-hours access; card access for employees, only entrance for firearms
3. Security goal/options: security architectural review will address

#### B. Tunnel

1. Uses/Purposes: General public/employee access
2. Security recommendation: Entrance screening; cameras
3. Security goal/options: security architectural review will address

#### C. James/Jefferson Street Doors

1. Uses/Purposes: Fire exits in
  - (a) West perimeter stairwells; access all the way to 12<sup>th</sup> floor
  - (b) East perimeter fire exits with access to 8<sup>th</sup> floor and 1<sup>st</sup> floor
2. Security recommendation: Alarm, camera
3. Security goal/options: Ensure no communication between adjacent stairwell/other access

## D. Information Desk - Day

1. Uses/Purposes: Customer information and service by day
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm, some form of communication to Courthouse Security
3. Security goal/options: Duress alarm, some form of communication to Courthouse Security

## E. Information Desk - Night

1. Uses/Purposes: security base for Facilities Management security, monitor traffic coming into Courthouse after hours
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm, hand-held scanner, radio, entrance screening
3. Security goal/options: Determine staff, traffic flow

## F. Security Office

1. Uses/Purposes: Gun lockers, muster room, Facilities Management Security Office, equipment/supply storage, central camera monitoring, site for dispatch

## 3. Floor 1 A

### A. Loading Dock

1. Uses/Purposes: Delivery of supplies, garbage removal, evidence transported in, access for undercover officers, general contractor staging area
2. Security recommendation: Police officer, duress alarm, screening of packages, verification of contents/materials
3. Security goal/options: Change methodology for deliveries, after-hours access for undercover police, exhibits

### B. Police Property Unit

1. Uses/Purposes: Evidence, photo lab, Quartermaster, armory, police property access, community center door, CIS door
2. Security recommendation: Card access, seal access to Community Center and CIS only; camera; remote control locks
3. Security goal/options: Allow controlled access for DPS staff into DPS offices

### C. Purchasing Stores

1. Uses/Purposes: Office supply storage
2. Security recommendation: None
3. Security goal/options: No special access

## 4. Second Floor

### A. Fourth Avenue Entrance

1. Uses/Purposes: General public/employee access, messenger/courier service
2. Security recommendation: Entrance screening for weapons; x-ray, add gun lockers and weapons listed in statute; cameras for after-hours access; card access for employees
3. Security goal/options: Reduce access during non-peak hours, ensure firearms not allowed in the building



**B. James/Jefferson Street Doors**

1. Uses/Purposes: Fire exits in
  - (a) West perimeter stairwells; access all the way to 12<sup>th</sup> floor
  - (b) East perimeter fire exits with access to 8<sup>th</sup> floor and 1<sup>st</sup> floor
2. Security recommendation: Alarm, camera
3. Security goal/options: Ensure no communication between adjacent stairwell/other access

**C. DAD Court Services**

1. Uses/Purposes: Pre-trial release unit, high-risk client population serviced by this staff
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm. Limited access to reception area, locks on office doors, locking file cabinets, barrier around reception desk, individual lockers with locks, limited computer access (not secure other than password), cover or replace glass windows outside of offices on 4<sup>th</sup> Avenue.
3. Security goal/options: Alternatives include relocating from other sensitive offices (e.g. Domestic Violence Advocates).

**D. DV Advocates**

1. Uses/Purposes: PAO unit provides victims assistance in DV disputes for District and Superior Courts
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm. Alarms, locks for cabinets, lockers for personal items
3. Security goal/options: Alternatives include relocating from other sensitive offices (e.g. Domestic Violence Advocates).

**E. OCRC**

1. Uses/Purposes: Executive agency responsible for civil rights compliance, complaints
2. Security recommendation: Barrier to prevent attacks on receptionist, alarms, locks for cabinets and lockers
3. Security goal/options: Should be absorbed in new space with Metro/King County merger; ask work group about recommendations for interim security

**F. Ombudsman**

1. Uses/Purposes: Office of citizen complaints
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm, controlled entrance. Alarm, barrier, locks and lockers

**G. Superior Court Courtrooms and Staff Space (Existing)**

1. Uses/Purposes: General purpose courtrooms and staff space
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, capability for secondary screening, camera

**H. Superior Court Courtrooms and Staff Space (In Construction)**

1. Uses/Purposes: General purpose courtrooms and staff space
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, capability for secondary screening, camera

## 5. *Third Floor*

### A. **Seattle District Court**

1. Uses/Purposes: Seattle branch of King County District Court with 5 courtrooms, arbitrator, probation, OPD and clerks office space
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, cameras. Possible: alarms, lockers, locks, counter barrier.
3. Security goal/options: DPS study will address

### B. **News Media Offices**

1. Uses/Purposes: Offices housing area media representatives
2. Security recommendation: None

### C. **Superior Court Courtrooms**

1. Uses/Purposes: General purpose courtrooms and staff space
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, capability for secondary screening, camera

### D. **Family Law Commissioners**

1. Uses/Purposes: General purpose courtrooms and staff space
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, capability for secondary screening, camera (?). Wire screen across the front counters with folding doors to shut off the front when closed. This would prevent angry emotional people from going across the counter. Private signs to be placed on the commissioners' chamber doors. Courtroom #3 needs to be enlarged so barrier can be put up between attorneys, Attorney General Advocates and clerk, bailiff and commissioner.

## 6. *Fourth Floor*

### A. **Executive Offices (also DEA, OFM and Regional Offices)**

1. Uses/Purposes: Houses Executive functions
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm.  
Receptionist - Duress alarm, automatic door open and close into Executive's office.  
DEA - Alarm, lockers, cabinets. Budget Office - Reception desk in front to be moved up by the front door instead of in the back past work areas with signs pointing to reception desk, large copier out in front.

### B. **Auditor**

1. Uses/Purposes: Houses Council Auditor
2. Security recommendation: None. Alarm and request walk throughs. People work late; no record of in case of fire or earthquake. People going to late council meetings can access auditor's area. Need a locking door from council area.
3. Security goal/options: None

### C. **Council Chambers**

1. Uses/Purposes: Location of King County Council chambers
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm, camera. Check with Council contact on security
3. Security goal/options: Ask Council members, work groups for recommendations

**D. Council Clerk's Office**

1. Uses/Purposes: Location of Council Clerk's office/maintains Council records
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm, secure entrance. Alarm, barrier at reception desk so public do not enter into offices, lockers

**E. Hearing and Zoning Examiner**

1. Uses/Purposes: Conducts appeals and holds meetings of administrative appeals
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm. Offices vacant

**F. Superior Court C.A.S.A. program**

1. Uses/Purposes: Temporary office space for court-appointed special advocates
2. Security recommendation: wait until relocation before evaluating

**7. Fifth Floor****A. Prosecutor's Office**

1. Uses/Purposes: Prosecuting Attorney's offices
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, controlled entry.
3. Security goal/options: Criminal - Alarm that works, barrier at receptionist area, locker rooms that lock (around back of offices, inter into civil side not secure), request walk throughs. Civil - Alarm, lockers, barrier to reception area with electric locks. Many prosecutors work late and are not checked on for their safety. In case of a disaster, no way to know how many or who in case of fire or earthquake for accountability.

**8. Sixth Floor****A. Law Library**

1. Uses/Purposes: Houses Law Library
2. Security recommendation: Three duress alarms, security cameras, electronic alarm on books taken out, remove locked storage cabinets by front door, alarms on fire exits, walk throughs. Again, issue of people working late hours that the library is open and library patrons have access to floors 2 - 12 after hours by elevators and stairs. (Final plan allows temporary access cards to be issued to visitors to the library to allow access to that floor only off-hours.)

**B. DJA**

1. Uses/Purposes: Superior Court Clerk's Office
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm; restricted access; cameras for public access counters. Alarms, personal lockers and barrier to reception area of director's office

**C. AIB and Title Companies**

1. Uses/Purposes: Private agencies in leased space
2. Security recommendation: None

**9. Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Floors****A. Superior Court Courtrooms and Space**

1. Uses/Purposes: General purpose courtrooms and staff space
2. Security recommendation: see other courtroom space recommendations

## B. Jury Assembly Room

1. Uses/Purposes: Assembly/check in area for Superior Court jurors
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm at desk
3. Security goal/options: see other courtroom space recommendations

## 10. Tenth Floor

### A. Superior Court Courtroom

1. Uses/Purposes: General purpose courtrooms and staff space
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, capability for secondary screening, camera
3. Security goal/options: see other courtroom space recommendations

### B. Council Chambers

1. Uses/Purposes: Location of King County Council chambers
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm, camera
3. Security goal/options: Ask Council members, work groups for recommendations

### C. Work Release

1. Uses/Purposes: Location for DAD work release
2. Security recommendation: All security provided by DAD Court Services Unit
3. Security goal/options: None

## 11. Twelfth Floor

### A. Council Offices

1. Uses/Purposes: Offices for Council members and staff
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, controlled access
3. Security goal/options: Security needs already incorporated

### B. Council Chambers Viewing Area

1. Uses/Purposes: Spectator seating for Council Chambers
2. Security recommendation: Unknown at this time

### C. Chief Criminal Courtroom

1. Uses/Purposes: High profile courtroom
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm, controlled access. Occupancy signs - enforced.
3. Security goal/options: Will be relocating to 9<sup>th</sup> floor

### D. DAD Holding Cells and Inmate Control

1. Uses/Purposes: Staging area for in-custody defendants
2. Security recommendation: All security provided by DAD Court Services Unit
3. Security goal/options: None

## 12. Other Facilities

### A. Central Building

1. Uses/Purposes: Family Court Services program offices, providing mediation and evaluation services to participants in domestic relations and domestic violence cases.
2. Security recommendation: Entrance screening, armed limited or full commissioned officer, duress alarm, bullet-proof glass, controlled access internal door
3. Security goal/options: Move offices back into the courthouse. In the interim, implement security recommended above.

### B. DYS

1. Uses/Purposes: Location for Juvenile Court, DYS, DJA, PAO and juvenile-justice related programs. Also the location for supervised visitation program contracted to Second Chance.
2. Security recommendation: Entrance screening; some duress alarms
3. Security goal/options: Space planning underway as part of capital project; provide x-ray machine; conduct study of courthouse tower, and Lower Alder Wing, including supervised visitation program, to provide recommendations on coordinating security needs at the facility and with the overall court security plan.

### C. Harborview

1. Uses/Purposes : Location of a Superior Court courtroom used to conduct mental illness hearings.
2. Security recommendation : continue to evaluate

9899

APRIL 26, 1995  
FINAL DRAFT

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR  
ARCHITECTURAL SECURITY MODIFICATIONS

FOR

**King County Courthouse**

---

Seattle, Washington

PREPARED FOR:

Department of Construction & Facilities Management  
King County Administrative Building, Room 320  
Seattle, Washington

PREPARED BY:

Robert Glass & Associates, Inc.  
P.O. Box 28097  
Spokane, Washington

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

## INTRODUCTION

## I. EXISTING CONDITIONS

A.	INTRODUCTION.....	I.1
B.	ARCHITECTURAL CONDITIONS.....	I.1
	1. Perimeter.....	I.1
	2. Interior Circulation.....	I.1
	3. Internal Public Counters.....	I.1
	4. Building Parking.....	I.2

## II. FACILITY OBSERVATIONS

A.	INTRODUCTION.....	II.1
B.	OBSERVATIONS.....	II.1
	1. Staffing.....	II.1
	2. Parking.....	II.1
	3. Lighting.....	II.1
	4. Entrances and Screening.....	II.1
	5. Intrusion Detection.....	II.2
	6. Stairways.....	II.2
	7. Personnel Security.....	II.2
	8. Property/Document Security.....	II.2
	9. Building Access Control.....	II.2
	10. Elevator Controls.....	II.2
	11. Video Surveillance System (VSS).....	II.2
	12. Duress Systems.....	II.3
	13. Central Monitoring Station.....	II.3

## III. RECOMMENDATIONS &amp; PROBABLE COSTS

A.	INTRODUCTION.....	III.1
B.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	III.1
	1. Staffing.....	III.2
	2. Parking.....	III.4
	3. Lighting.....	III.4
	4. Entrances and Screening.....	III.4

## Architectural Security Review and Recommendations

**9899**

5.	Intrusion Detection.....	III.8
----	--------------------------	-------

**III. RECOMMENDATIONS & PROBABLE COSTS (continued)**

6.	Stairways.....	III.8
7.	Personnel Security.....	III.9
8.	Property/Document Security.....	III.9
9.	Building Access Control.....	III.9
10.	Elevator Controls.....	III.9
11.	Video Surveillance System (VSS).....	III.9
12.	Duress Systems.....	III.10
13.	Central Monitoring Station.....	III.11
C.	PROBABLE COSTS.....	III.12
1.	Cost Table.....	III.12

*Note: Comments by the Executive and Oversight committee on certain observations and recommendations of this report are italicized.*



9899

**INTRODUCTION** - Most jurisdictions understand that effective security cannot be entirely unobtrusive. Reducing threats of violence, particularly of armed violence, requires controlled Courthouse access. Walk through metal detectors and x-ray devices at Courthouse entrances are a generally accepted means of prohibiting the introduction of weapons into the Courthouse. Sometimes it is argued that stringently controlled access should be limited to individual areas dealing with particular case types, such as serious criminal cases or family/domestic cases. Unfortunately, however, from a practical standpoint, incidents of random or spontaneous violence are about as common in civil cases as in criminal cases, and probably most prevalent of all in domestic cases, where emotions run especially high.

Conflicts between the image of justice and free access on one hand and preventive security and controlled access on the other is an issue that jurisdictions need to confront squarely. Effective security, particularly preventive security, carries a price tag. Equipment costs necessary to maintain an airport type screening/queuing system, may be a one time capital expense but operating costs may represent significant additional investment.

Recognition that change is taking place and a timely response by the county is important, so that the capital investment may be preserved. The alternative is piecemeal development, sometimes as a response to crisis, until the physical plant breaks down for lack of a coordinated plan, lack of capital budget, or both.

The Courthouse is now at the point where changes must be made, in security systems as discussed in this report and in the complete master planning for the orderly and ongoing development of the Courthouse site. Recommendations in this report should then be coordinated with potential site development for the best value to the County.

W. Robert Glass, AIA  
April 1995

**9899****I. EXISTING CONDITIONS**

A. **INTRODUCTION** - The King County Courthouse was built in 1916 with ongoing remodeling. Current architectural security requirements are now being incorporated into the building. This facility lacks a coordinated architectural security master plan that can be implemented as areas are remodeled. Robert Glass & Associates, Incorporated was retained by the Department of Construction and Facilities Management to provide an Architectural Security Review and Recommendations of the Courthouse.

B. **ARCHITECTURAL CONDITIONS** - The Courthouse does have a defined building "edge" as it meets the public streets, but the building has entry and exit points where it is difficult to control access/egress.

1. **Perimeter** - The Courthouse perimeter has the following entry/exit points:

- Tunnel to Municipal Building
- Basement parking entry tunnel
- Exit stair from basement to grade in the SW corner
- Building exit stair to grade in the SW corner
- Third Avenue entrance
- Tunnel to Administration Building
- Exit stair from basement to the James Street breeze way in the NW corner
- Exit Stairs from the basement to grade in the NW corner
- Building exit stair to grade in the NW corner
- Exit Stairs from the basement to grade in the NW corner
- Loading Dock
- Exit stair from basement to grade in the SE corner
- Building exit stair to grade in the SE corner
- Exit stair from basement to grade in the NE corner
- Building exit stair to grade in the NE corner
- Fourth Avenue entrance
- Court Holding Skybridge to Main Jail

2. **Interior Circulation** - The vertical circulation is made up of eight public/employee elevators, two maintenance elevators, one secure "in custody" elevator, one freight elevator, three interior stairwells and four fire exit stairs that open to grade. Elevators are used to move the majority of building users, stairs are used by few to move one or two floors at a time.

3. **Internal Public Counters** - These transaction counters are generally open to anyone, many are not staffed until someone arrives in the area. Some have duress alarm push buttons and can sometimes obtain quick assistance. Responding help would not know what problem has caused the duress alarm.

4. **Building Parking** - The basement level parking is limited to a few key vehicles and county maintenance vehicles since the shops are located in this area. Parking is accessed off a tunnel from the south side of the building. This use to be the jail intake sally-port.

9899

## II. FACILITY OBSERVATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION - Items listed below were observed during an on-site tour conducted April 6 & 7, 1995 by Robert Glass & Associates, Incorporated. These items are considered all part of an integrated security system that can give additional security without placing hardships on staff or public that must conduct business in the Courthouse.

### B. OBSERVATIONS

#### 1. Staffing

a. The building does not have a single entity responsible for security. The building has Facilities Security Staff ("Green Coats"), Courts Security Staff (Courts Security Officer), Building Security Officers (King County Police Department), Department of Adult Detention (in custody persons) and Contract Security Staff. There is a clear lack of a coordinated response from a central point within the facility.

#### 2. Parking

a. The building has limited parking in the basement for employees (Sheriff & County Executive) and parking for county shop vehicles which use the shops on the basement level. Access for this parking is off a tunnel and is easily breached. Persons with access to this level by pass all entrance screening and could leave any item for use later.

#### 3. Lighting

a. Exterior building lighting at night is typical downtown street lighting augmented by some entrance lighting. The entries on third and fourth avenues seem darker than they should be, also emergency exit entries do not have adequate lighting. Lighting is one of the best deterrents to intrusion by outsiders.

#### 4. Entrances and Screening

a. There are too many potential entrances into the building to adequately control the security of the building. Screening was not set up until after the March 2, 1995 shooting. In interviews with staff it seems to have reduced the amount of movement in the facility and has made it easier at some localized screening points since people have been screened once already.

5. Intrusion Detection
  - a. After hours intrusion systems are not used in the building sensitive storage areas are key locked, security staff does not know if these areas are penetrated.
  
6. Stairways
  - a. There aren't any intrusion devices currently used in the stairways, as a result the county is placing security staff in the exit stairwell to watch/listen for people in the stairwell. In addition, there are too many means of circulating vertically in the building making it difficult to contain a problem that may occur.
  
7. Personnel Security
  - a. There is not any way to distinguish employees in the building this makes it difficult to verify people are in places they should be without stopping and asking suspicious people.
  
8. Property/Document Security
  - a. Currently these are locked with keyed locks typically internal to an office suite, without any alarm system to notify security staff of unauthorized access.
  
9. Building Access Control
  - a. There is a limited use card access system that controls a few doors and the entrance tunnel to the basement parking area. The system is an out dated card "swipe" system that can be prone to sticking or being gummed up with dirt/garbage. Not all county employees have this card access ability.
  
10. Elevator Controls
  - a. Currently elevators can be locked off during after hours and selected ones used to limit movement to various floors, although the elevators used can stop wherever the rider wants. Once off on any floor movement can occur on the stairs so after hours people have free run of the building.
  
11. Video Surveillance System (VSS)
  - a. There is minimal use of video surveillance which leave staff blind to certain areas unless they walk and check them. This is mostly due to the fact that there isn't a place to monitor video surveillance cameras.

**9899**12. Duress Systems

- a. There are some isolated duress systems, mostly in the court rooms that respond over pagers to selected staff. Again, other staff does not know there is a problem and may be letting public into a building that should be shut down.

13. Central Monitoring Station

- a. There is not a central monitoring point within the building making it difficult to coordinate a response or verify that all is secure within the building after hours.

9899 17

III. RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROBABLE COSTS

A. INTRODUCTION - The recommendations listed below establish a security system for the building that would be the appropriate level. The County should investigate the sharing of control systems between buildings on this site and county wide, for example the King County Correctional Facility (KCCF) will be installing an access control system that could be expanded to include other county buildings or the Courthouse system could be expanded to include the KCCF facility.

These recommendations should be applied to the other courts related functions handled in facilities outside the Courthouse building, such as:

- ° Administration Building
- ° Yesler Building
- ° Family Courts (Central Building)
- ° Youth Services Center
- ° Harborview
- ° Prefontaine Building
- ° Smith Tower
- ° Columbia Center
- ° Bank of California
- ° Gateway Tower
- ° Exchange Building
- ° Central Building

Probable cost figures are included for each item in C below.

*The Oversight committee recommends the security plan be implemented in two phases.*

<i>PHASE ONE</i>	<i>PHASE TWO</i>
<i>Courthouse</i>	<i>Administration Building</i>
<i>Central Building (Family Court Services)</i>	<i>Yesler Building</i>
<i>Youth Service Center (DYS)</i>	<i>Prefontaine Building</i>
<i>Harborview (Secure Superior Courtroom)</i>	<i>Smith Tower</i>
	<i>Columbia Center</i>
	<i>Gateway Tower</i>
	<i>Bank of California</i>
	<i>Exchange Building</i>

# 9899

## Architectural Security Review and Recommendations

B. **RECOMMENDATIONS** - The recommendations below are grouped by subject item to match the categories mentioned in Section II - Observations. Many items should be laid out on floor plans and reviewed with operational staff before implementation. It is recommended that an Integrated Security Plan (ISP) be developed which will help the Department of Construction and Facilities Management in developing the scope of work for the projects envisioned, and to help define the necessary work requirements. The county is currently developing an ISP for use in the renovation of the King County Correctional Facilities electronic control systems and architectural security issues.

### I. Staffing

- a. The county will need to make a policy decision relating to the agency that will provide general building security and emergency dispatch for problems. This report recommends a Central Monitoring Station that will monitor all alarms in the building and dispatch appropriate staff to respond. At this time it is not clear what agency will operate the Central Monitoring Station.

Other agencies such as the Federal Courts System found that building security should rest with General Services, not the Federal Marshal when the building contains other functions besides courts in the building. Larger counties use this federal model as an approach to building security since the security system is just one of many systems in the building that need to be monitored daily. The federal model could apply to this building and allow the other County buildings in the area to be monitored by the Central Monitoring Station.

*The Oversight committee recommends a shared responsibility, with the Department of Public Safety responsible for all security functions during normal business hours, and the Department of Construction and Facilities Management responsible for security during off-hours.*

- b. The following staffing table is a listing of minimum staff required to operate the various security posts and entrance screening positions recommended in this report. The county may choose to contract some services from private vendors or provide all services through county staff. Staffing lists should be consistently refined as future design work occurs.

Basis of Calculations - The FTE multipliers are rounded for the purposes of this document. It is also recognized that a multiplier cannot be consistently applied across the board, as there are variables between civilian and sworn staff; training requirements for sworn staff being a good example.

The average productive year for the Staff is assumed to be 228.12 days ± (or shifts).

$$\frac{365 \text{ days/year}}{228.12 \text{ shifts}} = 1.60 \text{ rounded to nearest 10th.}$$



The annual productivity is determined by the amount of holidays, policies on vacations and sick time, injury and training time off, military leave and the like. Multipliers in other jurisdictions range from 1.58 to 1.80, or higher in a few instances.

Should King County FTE calculations change, the staffing list must be changed accordingly. The totals below are rounded to the nearest tenth.

- ° 5-day post for administrative staff  
no relief coverage.....1.00
- ° 5-day post for administrative staff  
where relief is covered by assistants  
and others.....1.20
- ° 7-day post, one shift.....1.60
- ° 7-day post, two shifts.....3.20
- ° 7-day post, three shifts.....4.80

c. Staffing Table

Name	Days Per Wk	Shifts				Sub Total	Rel Mult	Total	
		8-5	11-7	7-3	3-11				
<u>SECURITY</u>									
Security Supervisor	5	1	-	-	-	1.0	-	1.0	
CMS Operator	7	-	1	1	1	3.0	1.6	4.8	
Roving Security Staff (1)	7	-	1	2	2	5.0	1.6	8.0	
Loading Dock	5	1	-	-	-	1.0	1.2	1.2	
<u>THIRD AVENUE ENTRANCE</u>									
Security Officer	5	-	-	1	1	2.0	1.2	2.4	
Screening Staff	5	-	-	2	2	4.0	1.2	5.8	
<u>ADMINISTRATION BUILDING TUNNEL</u>									
Security Officer	5	-	-	1	1	2.0	1.2	2.4	
Screening Staff	5	-	-	1	1	2.0	1.2	2.4	
<u>FOURTH AVENUE ENTRANCE</u>									
Screening Staff	5	-	-	1	.5	1.5	1.2	1.8	
TOTAL									28.8

(1) Roving Staff covers the loading dock during busy hours.

9899

2. Parking

- a. The existing parking area and county maintenance shops in the Basement Level need to be eliminated since it provides a means to bypass the entrance screening system. This is an extremely vulnerable area since traffic into this area is completely unmonitored.

3. Lighting

- a. Additional lighting should be placed at the Third Avenue and Fourth Avenue entrances to provide a safer place for staff and public to enter the building. Building codes require the archway swinging doors at each location to be recessed so as not to swing onto the sidewalk. These recessed entrances should be very brightly lighted to discourage individuals from lurking and/or using this area for a rest room.


4. Entrances and Screening

- a. The County will need to make a policy decision on the screening of employees, will they be subjected to the same entrance screening as the public is required to follow.


*The Oversight committee recommends employees be screened like everyone else, and that there should be no separate employee entrance.*

- b. The Third Avenue entrance should be developed as the primary entrance for public and should be expanded to allow proper queuing space for the peak periods before morning and afternoon court sessions. See Illustration 1 for a suggested layout for this area.

9899



3rd Avenue Entrance- Illustration 1



3 RD. AVE ENTRANCE PLAN


Key

1. Baggage X-Ray machine
2. Walk Thru Metal Detector
3. 16 People/Minute Scanner/Assault-resistant door
4. 6 People/Minute Scanner/Assault-resistant door (Card Access control for King County employees) *Not recommended by Oversight committee*
5. Doors open during the day (Card Access control after hours for King County employees)
6. Exit doors unlocked during the day
7. ADA compliant door


9899

Fourth Avenue entrance should be employee only and would require less screening staff than the primary entrance. See Illustration 2.

*The Oversight committee recommends the Fourth Avenue Entrance be open to the general public.*



4th Avenue Entrance- Illustration 2




Key:


1. Baggage X-Ray machine
2. Walk Thru Metal Detector
3. Doors locked at all times (Card Access control for King County employees) *Not recommended by Oversight committee*
4. Exit walkway

9899

d. All persons using the tunnel entrance for the Courthouse will be screened similarly to the 4th avenue entrance. Screening devices will consist of a walk through scanner and a package x-ray scanner. See Illustration 3.



Tunnel Entrance- Illustration 3



TUNNEL ENTRY PLAN

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 FEET

9899

- e) The fire lane to the south of the building should be closed off with posts, bollards or other protective devices and only opened during the hours that the loading dock is open.

The Loading Dock, attended during delivery hours, should have intercom and VSS added to alert the Central Monitoring Station staff to the arrival of delivery trucks or maintenance vehicles. Delivery of all packages and mail should be at this point and will require screening.

- f. The tunnel connection from the Administration Building will remain a screening point for public and staff access and will require staffing. Hours of operation may be less than the main entrance on Third Avenue.
- g. The tunnel connection to the Municipal Building should be restricted to the transportation of inmates to/from court or evidence related materials. The opening should have an intercom, VSS and a door control from the Central Monitoring Station.

5. Intrusion Detection

- a. An intrusion detection system covering all perimeter door openings should be installed in the Courthouse, monitored by the Central Monitoring Station. After-hours motion detection should be added to protect the accessible windows. These should be monitored by the Central Monitoring Station.

6. Stairways

- a. The four fire exit stairs in each building corner should be equipped with an electric lock on each level that would be connected to the fire alarm system so they will unlock during a fire or "no power" situation. On some floors where judges use these for circulation, the locks can be operated by a card access reader. The exit door to grade level should be alarmed and the stairwell should have a motion detector monitored at the Central Monitoring Station.

There has been some discussion about adding VSS cameras inside the stairs to identify intruders, the VSS cameras will require lighting inside the stairwells to be upgraded and all "field-of-views" for cameras should be verified for adequate coverage.

- b. The internal stairway located on the south side of the central corridor should be equipped with an electric lock on each level which would be connected to the fire alarm system so they will unlock during a fire or "no power" situation.

- c. The two internal stairways on the north side of the central corridor should remain accessible for circulation during hours of use. After hours they should be equipped with electric locks similar to the other exit stairs listed above.

7. Personnel Security

- a. To provide better security to employees, a photo identification badge system will be added. This will incorporate a card access system into the badge and provide a dual function. This card access system will be used to provide after-hours access to work areas.

8. Property/Document Security

- a. Intrusion alarms should be added to all sensitive storage rooms for files, records, evidence and equipment rooms.

9. Building Access Control

- a. Employee photo identification badges will be incorporated into an access control card which will allow employees after-hours use of elevators to "locked-out" floors, access to office suite entries and the building perimeter at permitted locations.

10. Elevator Controls

- a. Elevators should have card access controls added for after hours usage by authorized employees. Card readers will be added in the cab or cabs to authorize dispatch of the cab to the various floors.
- b. Elevators not equipped with card readers would be locked-out and not available for use after hours.

11. Video Surveillance System (VSS)

- a. There are two types of monitoring which will occur at the Central Monitoring Station: 1) continuous monitoring of remote areas; and 2) selective monitoring of remote areas where a "security" movement is requested. VSS monitors must be in an "on" mode with the remote position in visual contact for the "door open" function to be activated.

9899

b) Video Surveillance Cameras should be added to following places:

- ° Basement tunnel access to Municipal building controlled door
- ° Third Avenue entrance screening
- ° Administration building tunnel entrance screening (duress alarm system)
- ° Loading Dock exterior
- ° Fourth Avenue entrance screening
- ° Superior Court Reception counter
- ° District Court Reception counter
- ° Family Courts entrance
- ° Prosecuting Attorney Criminal Division Reception counter (duress alarm system)
- ° Law Library Reception counter (duress alarm system)
- ° King County Council Reception counter (duress alarm system)
- ° Fire Exit stairwell exterior door openings

## 12. Duress System

- a. Duress alarm systems will be added at fixed positions, mostly counters where employees have direct public interaction. It is recommended that the duress alarm control the VSS image and intercom so the Central Monitoring Station can see and hear what is happening. The Courts have contracted with the engineering firm of Justice Systems Incorporated to upgrade the existing duress alarm system. Thier recommendations will be incorporated into the Central Monitoring Station discussed below.
- b. The following locations are presently identified as duress alarm locations:
- ° Superior Court Reception
  - ° District Court Reception
  - ° Prosecuting Attorney Criminal Division Reception
  - ° Law Library Reception
  - ° King County Council Reception
  - ° King County Council Chambers
  - ° Third Avenue entrance screening
  - ° Fourth Avenue entrance screening
  - ° Tunnel Screening
  - ° Sheriff Personnel Reception
  - ° Public Safety Technical Services Reception
  - ° Office of Citizen Complaint Reception
  - ° Department of Adult Detention-Court Services
  - ° Judicial Administration counters (sixth floor)
- c. Besides the above duress alarm points the Central Monitoring Station should monitor all courtroom duress alarms, and coordinate any response to alarms that may include shutting down entrance screening positions or alerting outside agencies.



**9899**13. Central Monitoring Station (CMS)

- a. The Central Monitoring Station is the "nerve center" for security and building management. In this capacity it is responsible for monitoring all security perimeter access/egress, major public/employee reception counters and security backup, emergency and life safety systems. This post will monitor all building systems. A partial listing may include:
- ° Life Safety Systems
  - ° Emergency Power Generation
  - ° Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)
  - ° Plumbing
  - ° Building Maintenance Issues
- b. The electronic controls and VSS monitors will be housed in custom-designed plastic laminate control cabinetry that will provide the optimum ergonomic layout for the operator. The cabinetry will be designed to allow for a work space, computer console and other required equipment.
- Electronic equipment will be placed in an electronic equipment room that will allow for ease of maintenance without disturbing the operating staff at the control console when maintenance is required.
- c. Additionally, the CMS can serve as a radio storage/issue area and a communications center with dedicated radio and telephone to City/County Dispatch.
- d. This Central Monitoring Station can be used to monitor other buildings used by the county that are near the Courthouse, (Yesler Building, Prefontaine Building and County Garage) thus providing a central county building security monitoring post.

9899<sup>C</sup>

**PROBABLE COSTS** - Listed below are budgetary probable physical plant improvement cost figures for each item discussed above:

No.	Item	Budgetary Cost
1.	Staffing	\$ Operational Cost
2.	Parking	\$ 0.00
3.	Lighting	\$ 35,200.00
4.	Entrances and Screening	\$ 335,500.00
5.	Intrusion Detection	\$ 44,000.00
6.	Stairways	\$ 115,500.00
7.	Personnel Security	\$ In Item #9
8.	Property/Document Security	\$ In Item #5
9.	Building Access Control	\$ 224,840.00
10.	Elevator Controls	\$ In Item #9
11.	Video Surveillance System (VSS)	\$ 66,000.00
12.	Duress System (Not including courtrooms which is provided under a different contract)	\$ 165,000.00
13.	Central Monitoring Station (CMS)	\$ 104,500.00
	<b>TOTAL IMPROVEMENTS</b>	<b>\$ 1,090,540.00</b>

(This figure should be increased by \$100,000 if the parking in the basement is not eliminated)

The above amount does not include Design Fees, Owners Contingency and Taxes.

# King County Long-Term Security Plan: Estimated Operations & Staffing Costs

# 9899

Facility/Area/Type of Staff	Number of posts	Relief sick/vac	Hours/Day	Hours/Week	Hourly rate	Total staff	FTE	Annual costs 1996
<b>King County Courthouse</b>								
Sergeant	1	1.00	8.0	40	\$ 31.25	1.00	1.00	\$ 65,000
3rd Avenue								
Officer	1	1.21	12.0	60	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.82	\$ 83,538
Screener: Peak hours	7	1.00	7.0	35	\$ 10.00	7.00		\$ 127,400
Screener: Non-peak hours	3	1.00	2.0	10	\$ 10.00	3.00		\$ 15,600
4th Avenue								
Officer	1	1.21	12.0	60	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.82	\$ 83,538
Screener: Peak hours	5	1.00	7.0	35	\$ 10.00	5.00		\$ 91,000
Screener: Non-peak hours	1.5	1.00	2.0	10	\$ 10.00	1.50		\$ 7,800
Tunnel to Administration Bldg								
Officer	1	1.21	12.0	60	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.82	\$ 83,538
Screener: Peak hours	3	1.00	7.5	38	\$ 10.00	3.00		\$ 58,500
Screener: Non-peak	2	1.00	2.3	11	\$ 10.00	2.00		\$ 11,700
Relief (breaks)								
Officer	1	1.21	12.0	60	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.82	\$ 83,538
Central Monitoring Station								
Screener	3	1.70	8.0	56	\$ 10.00	5.10		\$ 148,512
Patrol/Response								
Officer	3	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	3.64	4.55	\$ 208,845
Court area security (fl 3, 12, high-risk)								
Officer	5	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	6.07	7.59	\$ 348,075
<b>Department of Youth Services</b>								
Entrance								
Officer	2	1.21	12.0	60	\$ 22.05	2.43	3.64	\$ 167,076
Screener	0	1.00	12.0	60	\$ 10.00	0.00		\$ -
<b>Family Court Services (Central Building)</b>								
Entrance and Lobby								
Officer	1	1.21	8.0	40	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.21	\$ 55,692
<b>Harborview Secure Courtroom</b>								
Entrance								
Officer	1	1.21	8.0	40	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.21	\$ 55,692
<b>District Courts</b>								
Sergeant	1	1.00	8.0	40	\$ 31.25	1.00	1.00	\$ 65,000
Aukeen								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000
Bellevue								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000
Federal Way								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000
Issaquah								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000
Mercer Island								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	10	\$ 22.05	1.21	0.30	\$ 13,923
Northeast								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000
Renton								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000

## King County Long-Term Security Plan: Estimated Operations & Staffing Costs

Facility/Area/Type of Staff	Number of posts	Relief sick/vac	Hours/Day	Hours/Week	Hourly rate	Total staff	FTE	Annual costs 1996	
<b>Shoreline</b>									
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615	
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000	
<b>Southwest</b>									
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615	
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000	
<b>Vashon</b>									
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	3	\$ 22.05	1.21	0.08	\$ 3,481	
<b>Overtime</b>									
Maintenance Contract for Equipment and Security Systems								\$ 38,000	
O&M Costs <i>(radios, telephones, and misc equipment and supplies)</i>								\$ 20,000	
								\$ 120,000	
<b>Supervisors</b>							2.00	\$ 130,000	
<b>Officers</b>							38.02	\$ 1,743,856	
<b>Screeners - number of posts</b>							34.60	\$ 668,512	
<b>Staff total</b>							40.02	\$ 2,542,368	
<b>Courthouse Total</b>								20.43	\$ 1,507,440
<b>Department of Youth Services</b>								3.64	\$ 183,278
<b>Family Court Services</b>								1.21	\$ 61,093
<b>Harborview Secure Courtroom</b>								1.21	\$ 61,093
<b>District Courts Total</b>								13.52	\$ 907,465
<b>All Phase I areas - Total Cost Including OT and O&amp;M</b>							40.02	\$ 2,720,368	
<b>OT, Equipment, O&amp;M</b>									\$ 178,000
<b>Total Cost Including OT, Equipment, O&amp;M</b>									\$ 2,720,368
<b>Less 1995 Superior Court Security Budget &amp; DPS Sergeant</b>									\$ (640,000)
<b>All Phase I areas - Total additional cost</b>									\$ 2,080,368

Officer relief factor	1.21
Screener relief factor	1
Sergeant hourly rate	\$ 31.25
Officer hourly rate	\$ 22.05
Screener hourly rate	\$ 10.00

# King County Second Interim Security Plan: Estimated Operations and Staffing Costs

# 9899

Facility/Area/Type of Staff	Number of posts	Relief Factor	Hours/Day	Hours/Week	Hourly rate	Total staff	Total costs Jun - Dec 1995
<b>King County Courthouse</b>							
Sergeant	1	1.00	8.0	40	\$ 47.20	1.00	\$ 57,269
3rd Avenue							
Officer	1	1.00	12.0	60	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 73,619
Screener: Peak hours	7	1.00	7.0	35	\$ 10.00	7.00	\$ 74,317
Screener: Non-peak hours	3	1.00	2.0	10	\$ 10.00	3.00	\$ 9,100
4th Avenue							
Officer	1	1.00	12.0	60	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 73,619
Screener: Peak hours	5	1.00	7.0	35	\$ 10.00	5.00	\$ 53,083
Screener: Non-peak hours	1.5	1.00	2.0	10	\$ 10.00	1.50	\$ 4,550
Tunnel to Administration Bldg							
Officer	1	1.00	12.0	60	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 73,619
Screener: Peak hours	3	1.00	7.5	38	\$ 10.00	3.00	\$ 34,125
Screener: Non-peak	2	1.00	2.3	11	\$ 10.00	2.00	\$ 6,825
Central Monitoring Station							
Screener	3	1.70	8.0	56	\$ 10.00	5.10	\$ 74,256
Relief							
Officer	1	1.00	12.0	60	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 73,619
Facilities Day Shift Backup	1	1.00	8.0	40	\$ 16.40	1.00	\$ 19,899
Perimeter stairwells	4	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 16.40	4.00	\$ 14,213
<b>District Courts</b>							
Aukeen							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Bellevue							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Federal Way							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Issaquah							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Mercer Island							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	10	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 12,270
Northeast							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Renton							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Shoreline							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Southwest							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Vashon							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	10	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 12,270

## King County Second Interim Security Plan: Estimated Operations and Staffing Costs

Facility/Area/Type of Staff	Number of posts	Relief Factor	Hours/Day	Hours/Week	Hourly rate	Total staff	Total costs Jun - Dec 1995
Misc. Operating and Equipment							\$ 10,000
Supervisors	2.00						\$ 130,888
Officers	13.00						\$ 736,190
Screeners - number of posts	32.50						\$ 377,589
Facilities/Stairwell posts	5.00						\$ 34,112
<b>Staff total</b>	<b>52.50</b>						<b>\$ 1,278,780</b>
Courthouse Total	34.50						\$ 642,113
District Courts Total	18.00						\$ 636,666
<b>All Phase I areas - Total</b>	<b>52.50</b>						<b>\$ 1,278,780</b>
<b>Total Including O&amp;M</b>							<b>\$ 1,288,780</b>

Officer relief factor		1
Screeners relief factor		1
Sergeant hourly rate	\$	47.20
Officer hourly rate	\$	40.45
Screeners hourly rate	\$	10.00

Family Court Services, Harborview Medical Center and Department of Youth Services will continue to receive security services from Superior Court officers through the end of 1995.

Months: 7

**B. James/Jefferson Street Doors**

1. Uses/Purposes: Fire exits in
  - (a) West perimeter stairwells; access all the way to 12<sup>th</sup> floor
  - (b) East perimeter fire exits with access to 8<sup>th</sup> floor and 1<sup>st</sup> floor
2. Security recommendation: Alarm, camera
3. Security goal/options: Ensure no communication between adjacent stairwell/other access

**C. DAD Court Services**

1. Uses/Purposes: Pre-trial release unit, high-risk client population serviced by this staff
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm. Limited access to reception area, locks on office doors, locking file cabinets, barrier around reception desk, individual lockers with locks, limited computer access (not secure other than password), cover or replace glass windows outside of offices on 4<sup>th</sup> Avenue.
3. Security goal/options: Alternatives include relocating from other sensitive offices (e.g. Domestic Violence Advocates).

**D. DV Advocates**

1. Uses/Purposes: PAO unit provides victims assistance in DV disputes for District and Superior Courts
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm. Alarms, locks for cabinets, lockers for personal items
3. Security goal/options: Alternatives include relocating from other sensitive offices (e.g. Domestic Violence Advocates).

**E. OCRC**

1. Uses/Purposes: Executive agency responsible for civil rights compliance, complaints
2. Security recommendation: Barrier to prevent attacks on receptionist, alarms, locks for cabinets and lockers
3. Security goal/options: Should be absorbed in new space with Metro/King County merger; ask work group about recommendations for interim security

**F. Ombudsman**

1. Uses/Purposes: Office of citizen complaints
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm, controlled entrance. Alarm, barrier, locks and lockers

**G. Superior Court Courtrooms and Staff Space (Existing)**

1. Uses/Purposes: General purpose courtrooms and staff space
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, capability for secondary screening, camera

**H. Superior Court Courtrooms and Staff Space (In Construction)**

1. Uses/Purposes: General purpose courtrooms and staff space
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, capability for secondary screening, camera

## 5. *Third Floor*

### A. **Seattle District Court**

1. Uses/Purposes: Seattle branch of King County District Court with 5 courtrooms, arbitrator, probation, OPD and clerks office space
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, cameras. Possible: alarms, lockers, locks, counter barrier.
3. Security goal/options: DPS study will address

### B. **News Media Offices**

1. Uses/Purposes: Offices housing area media representatives
2. Security recommendation: None

### C. **Superior Court Courtrooms**

1. Uses/Purposes: General purpose courtrooms and staff space
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, capability for secondary screening, camera

### D. **Family Law Commissioners**

1. Uses/Purposes: General purpose courtrooms and staff space
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, capability for secondary screening, camera (?).  
Wire screen across the front counters with folding doors to shut off the front when closed. This would prevent angry emotional people from going across the counter. Private signs to be placed on the commissioners' chamber doors. Courtroom #3 needs to be enlarged so barrier can be put up between attorneys, Attorney General Advocates and clerk, bailiff and commissioner.

## 6. *Fourth Floor*

### A. **Executive Offices (also DEA, OFM and Regional Offices)**

1. Uses/Purposes: Houses Executive functions
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm.

Receptionist - Duress alarm, automatic door open and close into Executive's office.  
DEA - Alarm, lockers, cabinets. Budget Office - Reception desk in front to be moved up by the front door instead of in the back past work areas with signs pointing to reception desk, large copier out in front.

### B. **Auditor**

1. Uses/Purposes: Houses Council Auditor
2. Security recommendation: None. Alarm and request walk throughs. People work late; no record of in case of fire or earthquake. People going to late council meetings can access auditor's area. Need a locking door from council area.
3. Security goal/options: None

### C. **Council Chambers**

1. Uses/Purposes: Location of King County Council chambers
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm, camera. Check with Council contact on security
3. Security goal/options: Ask Council members, work groups for recommendations



**D. Council Clerk's Office**

1. Uses/Purposes: Location of Council Clerk's office/maintains Council records
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm, secure entrance. Alarm, barrier at reception desk so public do not enter into offices, lockers

**E. Hearing and Zoning Examiner**

1. Uses/Purposes: Conducts appeals and holds meetings of administrative appeals
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm. Offices vacant

**F. Superior Court C.A.S.A. program**

1. Uses/Purposes: Temporary office space for court-appointed special advocates
2. Security recommendation: wait until relocation before evaluating

**7. Fifth Floor****A. Prosecutor's Office**

1. Uses/Purposes: Prosecuting Attorney's offices
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, controlled entry.
3. Security goal/options: Criminal - Alarm that works, barrier at receptionist area, locker rooms that lock (around back of offices, inter into civil side not secure), request walk throughs. Civil - Alarm, lockers, barrier to reception area with electric locks. Many prosecutors work late and are not checked on for their safety. In case of a disaster, no way to know how many or who in case of fire or earthquake for accountability.

**8. Sixth Floor****A. Law Library**

1. Uses/Purposes: Houses Law Library
2. Security recommendation: Three duress alarms, security cameras, electronic alarm on books taken out, remove locked storage cabinets by front door, alarms on fire exits, walk throughs. Again, issue of people working late hours that the library is open and library patrons have access to floors 2 - 12 after hours by elevators and stairs. (Final plan allows temporary access cards to be issued to visitors to the library to allow access to that floor only off-hours.)

**B. DJA**

1. Uses/Purposes: Superior Court Clerk's Office
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm; restricted access; cameras for public access counters. Alarms, personal lockers and barrier to reception area of director's office

**C. AIB and Title Companies**

1. Uses/Purposes: Private agencies in leased space
2. Security recommendation: None

**9. Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Floors****A. Superior Court Courtrooms and Space**

1. Uses/Purposes: General purpose courtrooms and staff space
2. Security recommendation: see other courtroom space recommendations

## B. Jury Assembly Room

1. Uses/Purposes: Assembly/check in area for Superior Court jurors
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm at desk
3. Security goal/options: see other courtroom space recommendations

## 10. Tenth Floor

### A. Superior Court Courtroom

1. Uses/Purposes: General purpose courtrooms and staff space
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, capability for secondary screening, camera
3. Security goal/options: see other courtroom space recommendations

### B. Council Chambers

1. Uses/Purposes: Location of King County Council chambers
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm, camera
3. Security goal/options: Ask Council members, work groups for recommendations

### C. Work Release

1. Uses/Purposes: Location for DAD work release
2. Security recommendation: All security provided by DAD Court Services Unit
3. Security goal/options: None

## 11. Twelfth Floor

### A. Council Offices

1. Uses/Purposes: Offices for Council members and staff
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarms, controlled access
3. Security goal/options: Security needs already incorporated

### B. Council Chambers Viewing Area

1. Uses/Purposes: Spectator seating for Council Chambers
2. Security recommendation: Unknown at this time

### C. Chief Criminal Courtroom

1. Uses/Purposes: High profile courtroom
2. Security recommendation: Duress alarm, controlled access. Occupancy signs - enforced.
3. Security goal/options: Will be relocating to 9<sup>th</sup> floor

### D. DAD Holding Cells and Inmate Control

1. Uses/Purposes: Staging area for in-custody defendants
2. Security recommendation: All security provided by DAD Court Services Unit
3. Security goal/options: None

## 12. Other Facilities

### A. Central Building

1. Uses/Purposes: Family Court Services program offices, providing mediation and evaluation services to participants in domestic relations and domestic violence cases.
2. Security recommendation: Entrance screening, armed limited or full commissioned officer, duress alarm, bullet-proof glass, controlled access internal door
3. Security goal/options: Move offices back into the courthouse. In the interim, implement security recommended above.

### B. DYS

1. Uses/Purposes: Location for Juvenile Court, DYS, DJA, PAO and juvenile-justice related programs. Also the location for supervised visitation program contracted to Second Chance.
2. Security recommendation: Entrance screening; some duress alarms
3. Security goal/options: Space planning underway as part of capital project; provide x-ray machine; conduct study of courthouse tower, and Lower Alder Wing, including supervised visitation program, to provide recommendations on coordinating security needs at the facility and with the overall court security plan.

### C. Harborview

1. Uses/Purposes: Location of a Superior Court courtroom used to conduct mental illness hearings.
2. Security recommendation: continue to evaluate

9899

APRIL 26, 1995  
FINAL DRAFT

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR  
ARCHITECTURAL SECURITY MODIFICATIONS

FOR

**King County Courthouse**

---

Seattle, Washington

PREPARED FOR:

Department of Construction & Facilities Management  
King County Administrative Building, Room 320  
Seattle, Washington

PREPARED BY:

Robert Glass & Associates, Inc.  
P.O. Box 28097  
Spokane, Washington

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	
<b>I. EXISTING CONDITIONS</b>	
A. INTRODUCTION.....	I.1
B. ARCHITECTURAL CONDITIONS.....	I.1
1. Perimeter.....	I.1
2. Interior Circulation.....	I.1
3. Internal Public Counters.....	I.1
4. Building Parking.....	I.2
<b>II. FACILITY OBSERVATIONS</b>	
A. INTRODUCTION.....	II.1
B. OBSERVATIONS.....	II.1
1. Staffing.....	II.1
2. Parking.....	II.1
3. Lighting.....	II.1
4. Entrances and Screening.....	II.1
5. Intrusion Detection.....	II.2
6. Stairways.....	II.2
7. Personnel Security.....	II.2
8. Property/Document Security.....	II.2
9. Building Access Control.....	II.2
10. Elevator Controls.....	II.2
11. Video Surveillance System (VSS).....	II.2
12. Duress Systems.....	II.3
13. Central Monitoring Station.....	II.3
<b>III. RECOMMENDATIONS &amp; PROBABLE COSTS</b>	
A. INTRODUCTION.....	III.1
B. RECOMMENDATIONS.....	III.1
1. Staffing.....	III.2
2. Parking.....	III.4
3. Lighting.....	III.4
4. Entrances and Screening.....	III.4

9899

5. Intrusion Detection..... III.8

III. RECOMMENDATIONS & PROBABLE COSTS (continued)

6. Stairways..... III.8

7. Personnel Security..... III.9

8. Property/Document Security..... III.9

9. Building Access Control..... III.9

10. Elevator Controls..... III.9

11. Video Surveillance System (VSS)..... III.9

12. Duress Systems..... III.10

13. Central Monitoring Station..... III.11

C. PROBABLE COSTS..... III.12

1. Cost Table..... III.12

*Note: Comments by the Executive and Oversight committee on certain observations and recommendations of this report are italicized.*

9899

**INTRODUCTION** - Most jurisdictions understand that effective security cannot be entirely unobtrusive. Reducing threats of violence, particularly of armed violence, requires controlled Courthouse access. Walk through metal detectors and x-ray devices at Courthouse entrances are a generally accepted means of prohibiting the introduction of weapons into the Courthouse. Sometimes it is argued that stringently controlled access should be limited to individual areas dealing with particular case types, such as serious criminal cases or family/domestic cases. Unfortunately, however, from a practical standpoint, incidents of random or spontaneous violence are about as common in civil cases as in criminal cases, and probably most prevalent of all in domestic cases, where emotions run especially high.

Conflicts between the image of justice and free access on one hand and preventive security and controlled access on the other is an issue that jurisdictions need to confront squarely. Effective security, particularly preventive security, carries a price tag. Equipment costs necessary to maintain an airport type screening/queuing system, may be a one time capital expense but operating costs may represent significant additional investment.

Recognition that change is taking place and a timely response by the county is important, so that the capital investment may be preserved. The alternative is piecemeal development, sometimes as a response to crisis, until the physical plant breaks down for lack of a coordinated plan, lack of capital budget, or both.

The Courthouse is now at the point where changes must be made, in security systems as discussed in this report and in the complete master planning for the orderly and ongoing development of the Courthouse site. Recommendations in this report should then be coordinated with potential site development for the best value to the County.

W. Robert Glass, AIA  
April 1995

**9899****I. EXISTING CONDITIONS**

A. **INTRODUCTION** - The King County Courthouse was built in 1916 with ongoing remodeling. Current architectural security requirements are now being incorporated into the building. This facility lacks a coordinated architectural security master plan that can be implemented as areas are remodeled. Robert Glass & Associates, Incorporated was retained by the Department of Construction and Facilities Management to provide an Architectural Security Review and Recommendations of the Courthouse.

B. **ARCHITECTURAL CONDITIONS** - The Courthouse does have a defined building "edge" as it meets the public streets, but the building has entry and exit points where it is difficult to control access/egress.

1. **Perimeter** - The Courthouse perimeter has the following entry/exit points:

- Tunnel to Municipal Building
- Basement parking entry tunnel
- Exit stair from basement to grade in the SW corner
- Building exit stair to grade in the SW corner
- Third Avenue entrance
- Tunnel to Administration Building
- Exit stair from basement to the James Street breeze way in the NW corner
- Exit Stairs from the basement to grade in the NW corner
- Building exit stair to grade in the NW corner
- Exit Stairs from the basement to grade in the NW corner
- Loading Dock
- Exit stair from basement to grade in the SE corner
- Building exit stair to grade in the SE corner
- Exit stair from basement to grade in the NE corner
- Building exit stair to grade in the NE corner
- Fourth Avenue entrance
- Court Holding Skybridge to Main Jail

2. **Interior Circulation** - The vertical circulation is made up of eight public/employee elevators, two maintenance elevators, one secure "in custody" elevator, one freight elevator, three interior stairwells and four fire exit stairs that open to grade. Elevators are used to move the majority of building users, stairs are used by few to move one or two floors at a time.

3. **Internal Public Counters** - These transaction counters are generally open to anyone, many are not staffed until someone arrives in the area. Some have duress alarm push buttons and can sometimes obtain quick assistance. Responding help would not know what problem has caused the duress alarm.



4. **Building Parking** - The basement level parking is limited to a few key vehicles and county maintenance vehicles since the shops are located in this area. Parking is accessed off a tunnel from the south side of the building. This use to be the jail intake sally-port.

**9899****II. FACILITY OBSERVATIONS**

A. INTRODUCTION - Items listed below were observed during an on-site tour conducted April 6 & 7, 1995 by Robert Glass & Associates, Incorporated. These items are considered all part of an integrated security system that can give additional security without placing hardships on staff or public that must conduct business in the Courthouse.

**B. OBSERVATIONS****1. Staffing**

a. The building does not have a single entity responsible for security. The building has Facilities Security Staff ("Green Coats"), Courts Security Staff (Courts Security Officer), Building Security Officers (King County Police Department), Department of Adult Detention (in custody persons) and Contract Security Staff. There is a clear lack of a coordinated response from a central point within the facility.

**2. Parking**

a. The building has limited parking in the basement for employees (Sheriff & County Executive) and parking for county shop vehicles which use the shops on the basement level. Access for this parking is off a tunnel and is easily breached. Persons with access to this level by pass all entrance screening and could leave any item for use later.

**3. Lighting**

a. Exterior building lighting at night is typical downtown street lighting augmented by some entrance lighting. The entries on third and fourth avenues seem darker than they should be, also emergency exit entries do not have adequate lighting. Lighting is one of the best deterrents to intrusion by outsiders.

**4. Entrances and Screening**

a. There are too many potential entrances into the building to adequately control the security of the building. Screening was not set up until after the March 2, 1995 shooting. In interviews with staff it seems to have reduced the amount of movement in the facility and has made it easier at some localized screening points since people have been screened once already.

5. Intrusion Detection
  - a. After hours intrusion systems are not used in the building sensitive storage areas are key locked, security staff does not know if these areas are penetrated.
  
6. Stairways
  - a. There aren't any intrusion devices currently used in the stairways, as a result the county is placing security staff in the exit stairwell to watch/listen for people in the stairwell. In addition, there are too many means of circulating vertically in the building making it difficult to contain a problem that may occur.
  
7. Personnel Security
  - a. There is not any way to distinguish employees in the building this makes it difficult to verify people are in places they should be without stopping and asking suspicious people.
  
8. Property/Document Security
  - a. Currently these are locked with keyed locks typically internal to an office suite, without any alarm system to notify security staff of unauthorized access.
  
9. Building Access Control
  - a. There is a limited use card access system that controls a few doors and the entrance tunnel to the basement parking area. The system is an out dated card "swipe" system that can be prone to sticking or being gummed up with dirt/garbage. Not all county employees have this card access ability.
  
10. Elevator Controls
  - a. Currently elevators can be locked off during after hours and selected ones used to limit movement to various floors, although the elevators used can stop wherever the rider wants. Once off on any floor movement can occur on the stairs so after hours people have free run of the building.
  
11. Video Surveillance System (VSS)
  - a. There is minimal use of video surveillance which leave staff blind to certain areas unless they walk and check them. This is mostly due to the fact that there isn't a place to monitor video surveillance cameras.

**9899**

12.

Duress Systems

- a. There are some isolated duress systems, mostly in the court rooms that respond over pagers to selected staff. Again, other staff does not know there is a problem and may be letting public into a building that should be shut down.

13. Central Monitoring Station

- a. There is not a central monitoring point within the building making it difficult to coordinate a response or verify that all is secure within the building after hours.

9899

III. RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROBABLE COSTS

A. INTRODUCTION - The recommendations listed below establish a security system for the building that would be the appropriate level. The County should investigate the sharing of control systems between buildings on this site and county wide, for example the King County Correctional Facility (KCCF) will be installing an access control system that could be expanded to include other county buildings or the Courthouse system could be expanded to include the KCCF facility.

These recommendations should be applied to the other courts related functions handled in facilities outside the Courthouse building, such as:

- ° Administration Building
- ° Yesler Building
- ° Family Courts (Central Building)
- ° Youth Services Center
- ° Harborview
- ° Prefontaine Building
- ° Smith Tower
- ° Columbia Center
- ° Bank of California
- ° Gateway Tower
- ° Exchange Building
- ° Central Building

Probable cost figures are included for each item in C below.

*The Oversight committee recommends the security plan be implemented in two phases.*

<i>PHASE ONE</i>	<i>PHASE TWO</i>
<i>Courthouse</i>	<i>Administration Building</i>
<i>Central Building (Family Court Services)</i>	<i>Yesler Building</i>
<i>Youth Service Center (DYS)</i>	<i>Prefontaine Building</i>
<i>Harborview (Secure Superior Courtroom)</i>	<i>Smith Tower</i>
	<i>Columbia Center</i>
	<i>Gateway Tower</i>
	<i>Bank of California</i>
	<i>Exchange Building</i>

# 9899 Architectural Security Review and Recommendations

B. **RECOMMENDATIONS** - The recommendations below are grouped by subject item to match the categories mentioned in Section II - Observations. Many items should be laid out on floor plans and reviewed with operational staff before implementation. It is recommended that an Integrated Security Plan (ISP) be developed which will help the Department of Construction and Facilities Management in developing the scope of work for the projects envisioned, and to help define the necessary work requirements. The county is currently developing an ISP for use in the renovation of the King County Correctional Facilities electronic control systems and architectural security issues.

## I. Staffing

- a. The county will need to make a policy decision relating to the agency that will provide general building security and emergency dispatch for problems. This report recommends a Central Monitoring Station that will monitor all alarms in the building and dispatch appropriate staff to respond. At this time it is not clear what agency will operate the Central Monitoring Station.

Other agencies such as the Federal Courts System found that building security should rest with General Services, not the Federal Marshal when the building contains other functions besides courts in the building. Larger counties use this federal model as an approach to building security since the security system is just one of many systems in the building that need to be monitored daily. The federal model could apply to this building and allow the other County buildings in the area to be monitored by the Central Monitoring Station.

*The Oversight committee recommends a shared responsibility, with the Department of Public Safety responsible for all security functions during normal business hours, and the Department of Construction and Facilities Management responsible for security during off-hours.*

- b. The following staffing table is a listing of minimum staff required to operate the various security posts and entrance screening positions recommended in this report. The county may choose to contract some services from private vendors or provide all services through county staff. Staffing lists should be consistently refined as future design work occurs.

- ° Basis of Calculations - The FTE multipliers are rounded for the purposes of this document. It is also recognized that a multiplier cannot be consistently applied across the board, as there are variables between civilian and sworn staff, training requirements for sworn staff being a good example.

The average productive year for the Staff is assumed to be 228.12 days ± (or shifts).

$$\frac{365 \text{ days/year}}{228.12 \text{ shifts}} = 1.60 \text{ rounded to nearest 10th.}$$

The annual productivity is determined by the amount of holidays, policies on vacations and sick time, injury and training time off, military leave and the like. Multipliers in other jurisdictions range from 1.58 to 1.80, or higher in a few instances.

Should King County FTE calculations change, the staffing list must be changed accordingly. The totals below are rounded to the nearest tenth.

- ° 5-day post for administrative staff  
no relief coverage.....1.00
- ° 5-day post for administrative staff  
where relief is covered by assistants  
and others.....1.20
- ° 7-day post, one shift.....1.60
- ° 7-day post, two shifts.....3.20
- ° 7-day post, three shifts.....4.80

c. Staffing Table

Name	Days Per Wk	Shifts				Sub Total	Rel Mult	Total	
		8-5	11-7	7-3	3-11				
<u>SECURITY</u>									
Security Supervisor	5	1	-	-	-	1.0	-	1.0	
CMS Operator	7	-	1	1	1	3.0	1.6	4.8	
Roving Security Staff (1)	7	-	1	2	2	5.0	1.6	8.0	
Loading Dock	5	1	-	-	-	1.0	1.2	1.2	
<u>THIRD AVENUE ENTRANCE</u>									
Security Officer	5	-	-	1	1	2.0	1.2	2.4	
Screening Staff	5	-	-	2	2	4.0	1.2	5.8	
<u>ADMINISTRATION BUILDING TUNNEL</u>									
Security Officer	5	-	-	1	1	2.0	1.2	2.4	
Screening Staff	5	-	-	1	1	2.0	1.2	2.4	
<u>FOURTH AVENUE ENTRANCE</u>									
Screening Staff	5	-	-	1	.5	1.5	1.2	1.8	
TOTAL									28.8

(1) Roving Staff covers the loading dock during busy hours.

9899

2. Parking

- a. The existing parking area and county maintenance shops in the Basement Level need to be eliminated since it provides a means to bypass the entrance screening system. This is an extremely vulnerable area since traffic into this area is completely unmonitored.

3. Lighting

- a. Additional lighting should be placed at the Third Avenue and Fourth Avenue entrances to provide a safer place for staff and public to enter the building. Building codes require the archway swinging doors at each location to be recessed so as not to swing onto the sidewalk. These recessed entrances should be very brightly lighted to discourage individuals from lurking and/or using this area for a rest room.

4. Entrances and Screening


- a. The County will need to make a policy decision on the screening of employees, will they be subjected to the same entrance screening as the public is required to follow.

*The Oversight committee recommends employees be screened like everyone else, and that there should be no separate employee entrance.*


- b. The Third Avenue entrance should be developed as the primary entrance for public and should be expanded to allow proper queuing space for the peak periods before morning and afternoon court sessions. See Illustration 1 for a suggested layout for this area.



9899



3rd Avenue Entrance- Illustration 1



3 RD. AVE ENTRANCE PLAN


Key

- 1. Baggage X-Ray machine
- 2. Walk Thru Metal Detector
- 3. 16 People/Minute Scanner/Assault-resistant door
- 4. 6 People/Minute Scanner/Assault-resistant door (Card Access control for King County employees) *Not recommended by Oversight committee*
- 5. Doors open during the day (Card Access control after hours for King County employees)
- 6. Exit doors unlocked during the day
- 7. ADA compliant door


9899

Fourth Avenue entrance should be employee only and would require less screening staff than the primary entrance. See Illustration 2.

*The Oversight committee recommends the Fourth Avenue Entrance be open to the general public.*



4th Avenue Entrance- Illustration 2




Key:


1. Baggage X-Ray machine
2. Walk Thru Metal Detector
3. Doors locked at all times (Card Access control for King County employees) *Not recommended by Oversight committee*
4. Exit walkway

9899

d: All persons using the tunnel entrance for the Courthouse will be screened similarly to the 4th avenue entrance. Screening devices will consist of a walk through scanner and a package x-ray scanner. See Illustration 3.



Tunnel Entrance- Illustration 3



TUNNEL ENTRY PLAN

9899

- e. The fire lane to the south of the building should be closed off with posts, bollards or other protective devices and only opened during the hours that the loading dock is open.

The Loading Dock, attended during delivery hours, should have intercom and VSS added to alert the Central Monitoring Station staff to the arrival of delivery trucks or maintenance vehicles. Delivery of all packages and mail should be at this point and will require screening.

- f. The tunnel connection from the Administration Building will remain a screening-point for public and staff access and will require staffing. Hours of operation may be less than the main entrance on Third Avenue.
- g. The tunnel connection to the Municipal Building should be restricted to the transportation of inmates to/from court or evidence related materials. The opening should have an intercom, VSS and a door control from the Central Monitoring Station.

5. Intrusion Detection

- a. An intrusion detection system covering all perimeter door openings should be installed in the Courthouse, monitored by the Central Monitoring Station. After-hours motion detection should be added to protect the accessible windows. These should be monitored by the Central Monitoring Station.

6. Stairways

- a. The four fire exit stairs in each building corner should be equipped with an electric lock on each level that would be connected to the fire alarm system so they will unlock during a fire or "no power" situation. On some floors where judges use these for circulation, the locks can be operated by a card access reader. The exit door to grade level should be alarmed and the stairwell should have a motion detector monitored at the Central Monitoring Station.

There has been some discussion about adding VSS cameras inside the stairs to identify intruders, the VSS cameras will require lighting inside the stairwells to be upgraded and all "field-of-views" for cameras should be verified for adequate coverage.

- b. The internal stairway located on the south side of the central corridor should be equipped with an electric lock on each level which would be connected to the fire alarm system so they will unlock during a fire or "no power" situation.

- c. The two internal stairways on the north side of the central corridor should remain accessible for circulation during hours of use. After hours they should be equipped with electric locks similar to the other exit stairs listed above.

7. Personnel Security

- a. To provide better security to employees, a photo identification badge system will be added. This will incorporate a card access system into the badge and provide a dual function. This card access system will be used to provide after-hours access to work areas.

8. Property/Document Security

- a. Intrusion alarms should be added to all sensitive storage rooms for files, records, evidence and equipment rooms.

9. Building Access Control

- a. Employee photo identification badges will be incorporated into an access control card which will allow employees after-hours use of elevators to "locked-out" floors, access to office suite entries and the building perimeter at permitted locations.

10. Elevator Controls

- a. Elevators should have card access controls added for after hours usage by authorized employees. Card readers will be added in the cab or cabs to authorize dispatch of the cab to the various floors.
- b. Elevators not equipped with card readers would be locked-out and not available for use after hours.

11. Video Surveillance System (VSS)

- a. There are two types of monitoring which will occur at the Central Monitoring Station: 1) continuous monitoring of remote areas; and 2) selective monitoring of remote areas where a "security" movement is requested. VSS monitors must be in an "on" mode with the remote position in visual contact for the "door open" function to be activated.

9899

b) Video Surveillance Cameras should be added to following places:

- ° Basement tunnel access to Municipal building controlled door
- ° Third Avenue entrance screening
- ° Administration building tunnel entrance screening (duress alarm system)
- ° Loading Dock exterior
- ° Fourth Avenue entrance screening
- ° Superior Court Reception counter
- ° District Court Reception counter
- ° Family Courts entrance
- ° Prosecuting Attorney Criminal Division Reception counter (duress alarm system)
- ° Law Library Reception counter (duress alarm system)
- ° King County Council Reception counter (duress alarm system)
- ° Fire Exit stairwell exterior door openings

12. Duress System

- a. Duress alarm systems will be added at fixed positions, mostly counters where employees have direct public interaction. It is recommended that the duress alarm control the VSS image and intercom so the Central Monitoring Station can see and hear what is happening. The Courts have contracted with the engineering firm of Justice Systems Incorporated to upgrade the existing duress alarm system. Their recommendations will be incorporated into the Central Monitoring Station discussed below.
- b. The following locations are presently identified as duress alarm locations:
- ° Superior Court Reception
  - ° District Court Reception
  - ° Prosecuting Attorney Criminal Division Reception
  - ° Law Library Reception
  - ° King County Council Reception
  - ° King County Council Chambers
  - ° Third Avenue entrance screening
  - ° Fourth Avenue entrance screening
  - ° Tunnel Screening
  - ° Sheriff Personnel Reception
  - ° Public Safety Technical Services Reception
  - ° Office of Citizen Complaint Reception
  - ° Department of Adult Detention-Court Services
  - ° Judicial Administration counters (sixth floor)
- c. Besides the above duress alarm points the Central Monitoring Station should monitor all courtroom duress alarms, and coordinate any response to alarms that may include shutting down entrance screening positions or alerting outside agencies.

**9899**13. Central Monitoring Station (CMS)

- a. The Central Monitoring Station is the "nerve center" for security and building management. In this capacity it is responsible for monitoring all security perimeter access/egress, major public/employee reception counters and security backup, emergency and life safety systems. This post will monitor all building systems. A partial listing may include:
- ° Life Safety Systems
  - ° Emergency Power Generation
  - ° Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)
  - ° Plumbing
  - ° Building Maintenance Issues
- b. The electronic controls and VSS monitors will be housed in custom-designed plastic laminate control cabinetry that will provide the optimum ergonomic layout for the operator. The cabinetry will be designed to allow for a work space, computer console and other required equipment.
- Electronic equipment will be placed in an electronic equipment room that will allow for ease of maintenance without disturbing the operating staff at the control console when maintenance is required.
- c. Additionally, the CMS can serve as a radio storage/issue area and a communications center with dedicated radio and telephone to City/County Dispatch.
- d. This Central Monitoring Station can be used to monitor other buildings used by the county that are near the Courthouse, (Yesler Building, Prefontaine Building and County Garage) thus providing a central county building security monitoring post.

9899<sup>C</sup>

PROBABLE COSTS - Listed below are budgetary probable physical plant improvement cost figures for each item discussed above:

No.	Item	Budgetary Cost
1.	Staffing	\$ Operational Cost
2.	Parking	\$ 0.00
3.	Lighting	\$ 35,200.00
4.	Entrances and Screening	\$ 335,500.00
5.	Intrusion Detection	\$ 44,000.00
6.	Stairways	\$ 115,500.00
7.	Personnel Security	\$ In Item #9
8.	Property/Document Security	\$ In Item #5
9.	Building Access Control	\$ 224,840.00
10.	Elevator Controls	\$ In Item #9
11.	Video Surveillance System (VSS)	\$ 66,000.00
12.	Duress System (Not including courtrooms which is provided under a different contract)	\$ 165,000.00
13.	Central Monitoring Station (CMS)	\$ 104,500.00
	TOTAL IMPROVEMENTS	\$ 1,090,540.00

(This figure should be increased by \$100,000 if the parking in the basement is not eliminated)

The above amount does not include Design Fees, Owners Contingency and Taxes.



# King County Long-Term Security Plan: Estimated Operations & Staffing Costs

# 9899

Facility/Area/Type of Staff	Number of posts	Relief sick/vac	Hours/Day	Hours/Week	Hourly rate	Total staff	FTE	Annual costs 1996
<b>King County Courthouse</b>								
Sergeant	1	1.00	8.0	40	\$ 31.25	1.00	1.00	\$ 65,000
3rd Avenue								
Officer	1	1.21	12.0	60	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.82	\$ 83,538
Screener: Peak hours	7	1.00	7.0	35	\$ 10.00	7.00		\$ 127,400
Screener: Non-peak hours	3	1.00	2.0	10	\$ 10.00	3.00		\$ 15,600
4th Avenue								
Officer	1	1.21	12.0	60	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.82	\$ 83,538
Screener: Peak hours	5	1.00	7.0	35	\$ 10.00	5.00		\$ 91,000
Screener: Non-peak hours	1.5	1.00	2.0	10	\$ 10.00	1.50		\$ 7,800
Tunnel to Administration Bldg								
Officer	1	1.21	12.0	60	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.82	\$ 83,538
Screener: Peak hours	3	1.00	7.5	38	\$ 10.00	3.00		\$ 58,500
Screener: Non-peak	2	1.00	2.3	11	\$ 10.00	2.00		\$ 11,700
Relief (breaks)								
Officer	1	1.21	12.0	60	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.82	\$ 83,538
Central Monitoring Station								
Screener	3	1.70	8.0	56	\$ 10.00	5.10		\$ 148,512
Patrol/Response								
Officer	3	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	3.64	4.55	\$ 208,845
Court area security (fl 3, 12, high-risk)								
Officer	5	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	6.07	7.59	\$ 348,075
<b>Department of Youth Services</b>								
Entrance								
Officer	2	1.21	12.0	60	\$ 22.05	2.43	3.64	\$ 167,076
Screener	0	1.00	12.0	60	\$ 10.00	0.00		\$ -
<b>Family Court Services (Central Building)</b>								
Entrance and Lobby								
Officer	1	1.21	8.0	40	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.21	\$ 55,692
<b>Harborview Secure Courtroom</b>								
Entrance								
Officer	1	1.21	8.0	40	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.21	\$ 55,692
<b>District Courts</b>								
Sergeant	1	1.00	8.0	40	\$ 31.25	1.00	1.00	\$ 65,000
Aukeen								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000
Bellevue								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000
Federal Way								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000
Issaquah								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000
Mercer Island								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	10	\$ 22.05	1.21	0.30	\$ 13,923
Northeast								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000
Renton								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000

## King County Long-Term Security Plan: Estimated Operations & Staffing Costs

Facility/Area/Type of Staff	Number of posts	Relief sick/vac	Hours/Day	Hours/Week	Hourly rate	Total staff	FTE	Annual costs 1996
Shoreline								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000
Southwest								\$ -
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	50	\$ 22.05	1.21	1.52	\$ 69,615
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00		\$ 26,000
Vashon								
Officer	1	1.21	10.0	3	\$ 22.05	1.21	0.08	\$ 3,481
Overtime								\$ 38,000
Maintenance Contract for Equipment and Security Systems								\$ 20,000
O&M Costs <i>(radios, telephones, and misc equipment and supplies)</i>								\$ 120,000
Supervisors							2.00	\$ 130,000
Officers							38.02	\$ 1,743,856
Screeners - number of posts						34.60		\$ 668,512
<b>Staff total</b>							<b>40.02</b>	<b>\$ 2,542,368</b>
<b>Courthouse Total</b>							<b>20.43</b>	<b>\$ 1,507,440</b>
Department of Youth Services							3.64	\$ 183,278
Family Court Services							1.21	\$ 61,093
Harborview Secure Courtroom							1.21	\$ 61,093
<b>District Courts Total</b>							<b>13.52</b>	<b>\$ 907,465</b>
<b>All Phase I areas - Total Cost Including OT and O&amp;M</b>							<b>40.02</b>	<b>\$ 2,720,368</b>
OT, Equipment, O&M								\$ 178,000
<b>Total Cost Including OT, Equipment, O&amp;M</b>								<b>\$ 2,720,368</b>
<b>Less 1995 Superior Court Security Budget &amp; DPS Sergeant</b>								<b>\$ (640,000)</b>
<b>All Phase I areas - Total additional cost</b>								<b>\$ 2,080,368</b>

Officer relief factor	1.21
Screener relief factor	1
Sergeant hourly rate	\$ 31.25
Officer hourly rate	\$ 22.05
Screener hourly rate	\$ 10.00

# King County Second Interim Security Plan: Estimated Operations and Staffing Costs

# 9899

Facility/Area/Type of Staff	Number of posts	Relief Factor	Hours/Day	Hours/Week	Hourly rate	Total staff	Total costs Jun - Dec 1995
<b>King County Courthouse</b>							
Sergeant	1	1.00	8.0	40	\$ 47.20	1.00	\$ 57,269
3rd Avenue							
Officer	1	1.00	12.0	60	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 73,619
Screener: Peak hours	7	1.00	7.0	35	\$ 10.00	7.00	\$ 74,317
Screener: Non-peak hours	3	1.00	2.0	10	\$ 10.00	3.00	\$ 9,100
4th Avenue							
Officer	1	1.00	12.0	60	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 73,619
Screener: Peak hours	5	1.00	7.0	35	\$ 10.00	5.00	\$ 53,083
Screener: Non-peak hours	1.5	1.00	2.0	10	\$ 10.00	1.50	\$ 4,550
Tunnel to Administration Bldg							
Officer	1	1.00	12.0	60	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 73,619
Screener: Peak hours	3	1.00	7.5	38	\$ 10.00	3.00	\$ 34,125
Screener: Non-peak	2	1.00	2.3	11	\$ 10.00	2.00	\$ 6,825
Central Monitoring Station							
Screener	3	1.70	8.0	56	\$ 10.00	5.10	\$ 74,256
Relief							
Officer	1	1.00	12.0	60	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 73,619
Facilities Day Shift Backup	1	1.00	8.0	40	\$ 16.40	1.00	\$ 19,899
Perimeter stairwells	4	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 16.40	4.00	\$ 14,213
<b>District Courts</b>							
Aukeen							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Bellevue							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Federal Way							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Issaquah							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Mercer Island							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	10	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 12,270
Northeast							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Renton							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Shoreline							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Southwest						\$	-
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 61,349
Screener	1	1.00	10.0	50	\$ 10.00	1.00	\$ 15,167
Vashon							
Officer	1	1.00	10.0	10	\$ 40.45	1.00	\$ 12,270

## King County Second Interim Security Plan: Estimated Operations and Staffing Costs

Facility/Area/Type of Staff	Number of posts	Relief Factor	Hours/ Day	Hours/ Week	Hourly rate	Total staff	Total costs Jun - Dec 1995
Misc. Operating and Equipment							\$ 10,000
Supervisors	2.00						\$ 130,888
Officers	13.00						\$ 736,190
Screeners - number of posts	32.50						\$ 377,589
Facilities/Stairwell posts	5.00						\$ 34,112
<b>Staff total</b>	<b>52.50</b>						<b>\$ 1,278,780</b>
Courthouse Total	34.50						\$ 642,113
District Courts Total	18.00						\$ 636,666
<b>All Phase I areas - Total</b>	<b>52.50</b>						<b>\$ 1,278,780</b>
<b>Total Including O&amp;M</b>							<b>\$ 1,288,780</b>

Officer relief factor		1
Screeners relief factor		1
Sergeant hourly rate	\$	47.20
Officer hourly rate	\$	40.45
Screeners hourly rate	\$	10.00

Family Court Services, Harborview Medical Center and Department of Youth Services will continue to receive security services from Superior Court officers through the end of 1995.

Months: 7